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Nationalizing International Criminal Law:
The International Criminal Court As a Roving Mixed Court
Jenia Iontcheva

After a period of initial optimism, a dose of reality has set in for the fervent
supporters of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Many scholars celebrated the
arrival of the ICC as heralding an era of swifter and more consistent enforcement of
human rights and humanitarian law. To its most enthusiastic proponents, the Court was
to be “the central pillar in the world community for upholding fundamental dictates of
humanity.” 1
The impracticality of these visions has become increasingly apparent. The
qualified support from many countries and the complete lack of support from the United
States have led to sharp limitations on the ICC’s power.2 As a result, the enforcement of
international criminal law remains heavily dependent on the initiative and support of
actors other than the ICC.
Contrary to much academic commentary, this Article argues that a less centralized
regime, and one that is less dominated by a powerful ICC, is not a cause for despair—
even for those who favor vigorous enforcement of international criminal law. An allpowerful and far-reaching ICC may lack legitimacy and have little direct impact on
countries recovering from violent conflict. A less hierarchical international criminal justice
system that relies significantly on national governments is likely to be better informed by
diverse perspectives, more acceptable to local populations, and more effective in
accomplishing its ultimate goals.

Antonio Cassese, From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the International Criminal Court, in 1 THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 18 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE
ROME STATUTE]; see also Robert Badinter, International Criminal Justice: From Darkness to Light, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE, supra,
at 1935 (praising the Court as “new judicial dawn, devoted to the struggle against crimes against humanity”); Klaus Kinkel,
Der Internationale Strafsgerichtshof—ein Meilenstein in der Entwicklung des Volkerrechts, 51 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
2650 (1998) The Rome Treaty, establishing the ICC, itself has been hailed as the “United Nations’ most significant
accomplishment since its establishment in 1945.” M. Cherif Bassiouni, Preface, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999)
2 See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (2003)
1
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Accepting these arguments need not lead to the view that the ICC should be
abandoned altogether, the approach favored by some commentators.3 The ICC can still
play an important role in a less centralized regime. This Article sets forth a vision of an
ICC that focuses less on independent prosecutions in The Hague, and more on
involvement of the ICC at the national level. A key part of this vision is the participation
of the ICC in mixed tribunals that would be established in the state most directly affected
by a prosecution. The model would be closer to the war crimes tribunals recently
established in Sierra Leone and East Timor than to the international tribunals established
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Greater interaction between the ICC and national
authorities is likely to engender better and more widely accepted interpretations of
international law.4 It is also more likely to produce a system of enforcement that is
sustainable and enduring.
Part I of the Article describes the practical limitations on the ICC’s work and
concludes that the duty of enforcing international criminal law will continue to depend
heavily on the action of national authorities. Part II explains why a decentralized
approach to enforcement is desirable on theoretical and practical grounds. Part III
proceeds to outline an appropriate place for the ICC in a pluralist, decentralized
international criminal justice system. The argument will be that human rights would not
suffer if the ICC’s operations in The Hague take on a less visible and dominant role. As
this Article argues throughout, a Court that is less hierarchical and more agile would
better encourage broad enforcement of humanitarian and human rights law. Although the
impact of the Court would be felt more slowly, it would be more lasting.
I. A COURT OF LAST RESORT: PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ICC’S WORK
Many international law scholars and activists have high hopes for the ICC as a tool
for preventing and combating human rights violations. It is doubtful, however, that the
ICC will have the political capital to meet the expectations of its more ardent supporters.
3 Charles Krauthammer, Our Real Friends in Europe, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 26, 2002; George Will, A Court for Chaos, N.Y.
POST, July 7, 2002.
4 In particular, this Article builds on the idea that deliberation can produce more legitimate and more informed judgments
on contested questions of law and politics, such as questions of human rights and humanitarian law. Cf. Jenia Iontcheva,
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 339-343 (2003) (arguing that democratic deliberation leads to more
informed and more legitimate verdicts in criminal cases)

4

Nationalizing International Criminal Law

(draft—please do not cite or circulate without permission)

Support for a powerful international court has never been resounding among those who
have the power to make it so. The United States has withdrawn its support altogether, a
position that is unlikely to change any time in the near future. Several other major powers
have also resisted the idea of a strong Court.
Support for a powerful court was relatively thin even during the drafting of its
founding statute. The qualified support from states resulted in a statute with many
compromises and restrictions on the Court’s powers. The statute sharply limits the ICC’s
jurisdiction, and both the enforcement of the Court’s orders and its financing are
contingent on the goodwill of domestic authorities. Even as the Court begins its
operations, its powers will remain limited, and other tribunals will still carry out the
majority of human rights prosecutions.
A. Grand Visions of the Court: The ICC as the Central Pillar of Human Rights Enforcement
Many scholars envision the ICC at the helm of global efforts to develop and
enforce human rights and humanitarian law.5 They have high hopes for the tribunal and
expect it to advance international justice swiftly, impartially, and effectively. As UN
Secretary Kofi Annan has stated, “In the prospect of an international criminal court lies
the promise of universal justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision.”6
More concretely, the ICC is expected to develop international criminal law by
building upon the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) The Court is to “clarify existing ambiguities in the law”

E.g., BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE (1980); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1991); Louis René Beres, After the Gulf
War: Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Under the Rule of Law, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487 (1991); William N. Gianaris, The New
World Order and the Need for an International Criminal Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 88 (1992-93); Leila Nadya Sadat & S.
Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381 (2000); Int’l Law Assoc’n
(Amer. Branch) Committee on a Permanent Int’l Crim. Ct., First Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes and
Complementarity, December 27, 1996, 13 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 159 (1997) (Leila Sadat Wexler, Reporter) Those who
have expressed greater reservations include Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Court in Context: Mediating the
Global and Local in the Age of Accountability, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2003) (book review); Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of
States/ Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999); Goldsmith, supra note 2; W. Michael Reisman, Legal
Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 75; David
Wippman, Exaggerating the ICC (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
6 Press Release, Statement of Secretary-General Kofi Annan Before the International Bar Association in New York (June 12,
1997), U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6257 (1997), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19970612.sgsm6257.html.
5
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and to set the “highest international standards” of due process. 7 The Court is expected not
only to make jurisprudential advances, but also to provide prompt investigations and
prosecutions of reported atrocities.8 The Court’s supporters believe that the ICC will put
an end to impunity for grave human rights violations and deter war crimes around the
world.9
The ICC is thus seen by many as the beacon of a new era of global justice,
unfettered by national boundaries. Cherif Bassiouni has urged that “[w]e no longer live in
a world where narrow conceptions of jurisdiction and sovereignty can stand in the way of
an effective system of international cooperation for the prevention and control of
international and transnational criminality.”10 Instead, the ICC will serve as “a pillar in the
construction of a new international political ethic, a code of conduct that the community
of nations is committed to applying when states fail to do so themselves.”11
Whatever the philosophical merits of this vision of global justice, a subject to
which I turn in Part II, a sober assessment of the ICC’s political standing shows that this
grand vision of the Court is not likely to become a reality any time soon.
B. Before and After the Rome Treaty: States’ Reservations About a Powerful International
Criminal Court
Even as the idea of the ICC gathered momentum, support for the Court was
qualified. To a degree not appreciated by many of the Court’s partisans, the limited
commitment by member states to the ICC project is likely to constrain the Court’s ability
to fulfill the great expectations that many scholars and activists have for it.
The idea of a permanent international criminal tribunal traces its origins back to a
convention drafted by the League of Nations in 1937.12 The proposed tribunal was to try

E.g., Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 291, 294 (1998); see also Otto Triffterer, Domesticos de ratificacion e implementacion, in LA NUEVA JUSTICIA PENAL
SUPRANACIONAL: DESARROLLOS POST-ROMA 13, 44, 45 (Kai Ambos ed., 2002) (expressing hope that the ICC will clarify and
advance international criminal law and will thus contribute to the globalization of criminal justice)
8 Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 665, 712 (1996);
Richard J. Goldstone, The Role of International Criminal Law in the Prosecution of War Crimes, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 371
(2002)
9 Mauro Politi, Introduction, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 8, 15 (Mauro
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds. 2001); Press Release, supra note 6.
10 Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 33-34.
11 Richard B. Bilder & Reed Brody, Book Review, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 273 (2002)
12 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 211 (2002)
7
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international terrorist offenses. The idea never gathered sufficient support to materialize.13
After World War and the successful creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the
UN General Assembly revived the proposal for a permanent international criminal
tribunal in a resolution passed in 1948.14 Although many countries were convinced of the
need for a permanent tribunal in the wake of World War II atrocities, the idea became a
casualty of the Cold War and was set aside.15
With the end of the Cold War, the notion of an International Criminal Court again
became politically feasible. A resurgence of ethnic violence and transnational crimes such
as drug trafficking and terrorism made the project especially relevant. Overpowered by
trans-border drug crime, Latin American countries sponsored a resolution in the General
Assembly, calling for an international criminal court to deal with such crimes more
effectively.16 After more countries expressed an interest in the proposal, the UN General
Assembly charged the International Law Commission with preparing a draft statute.17
The Commission completed the draft in 1994 and forwarded it to the General Assembly
for consideration.18 The General Assembly in turn established a Preparatory Committee to
prepare a consolidated draft statute that would serve as the basis for negotiations at a
Diplomatic Conference in Rome in 1998.19 Delegates from more than 150 countries and
175 non-governmental organizations attended the Conference to draft and negotiate the
final version of the statute.20 After five weeks of intense negotiations, the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court was adopted by a vote of 120-to-7, with twenty-one
countries abstaining.21

Id. at 211.
G.A. Res. 260B, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt.1, at 177, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
15 M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need To Establish a Permanent International Criminal
Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 52 (1997)
16 The delegation of Trinidad and Tobago was the moving force behind these efforts. See Request for the Inclusion of a
Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Forty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/44/195 (1989); see also Agenda Item 152,
International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities Engaged in Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs Across
National Frontiers and Other Transnational Criminal Activities Establishment of an International Criminal Court with
Jurisdiction Over Such Crimes, Report of the Sixth Committee to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/44/770 (1989)
[hereinafter Agenda Item 152].
17 G.A. Res. 44/39 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.No.49, at 310, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989)
18 G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/53 (1995); G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc
A/Res/50/46 (1995)
19 G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc A/Res/50/46 (1995)
20 ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at 325; Alessandra Stanley, Conference Opens on Creating Court To Try War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1998, at A1.
21 Sadat & Carden, supra note 5, at 384.
13
14
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The large number of delegations that voted for the Statute is seen by many as an
indication of the overwhelming support for the Court—especially in light of the speedy
ratifications of the Statute, currently standing at ninety.22 Often missed in the story of the
court’s creation is that a majority of the participating states were reluctant to endorse a
strong court. Throughout the drafting process, many state delegates expressed a strong
preference for domestic prosecutions and insisted that international trials remain a lastresort option.23 The final version of the Statute largely reflects those preferences.
The initial proposal for the ICC itself envisioned not an active supranational body,
but a supporting institution that would come to the aid of countries that find themselves
unable to deal with transnational crime.24 Debates about the jurisdiction of the Court and
its relationship to national judiciaries also suggest that the majority of negotiating states
did not favor a powerful international criminal court, but were concerned about retaining
the power to prosecute crimes committed on their territory or by their own nationals.25
A reflection of these sovereignty concerns is the principle of complementarity, a
key feature of the ICC Statute. This principle provides that the Court can accept cases only
where national authorities are unwilling or unable to handle them (complementarity will
be administered in practice through ICC decisions on the admissibility of cases, so the
terms admissibility and complementarity are often used interchangeably)26 The ICC’s role
as an institution complementary to domestic courts proved to be so fundamental to the

International Criminal Court, at http://www.icc-cpi.int (last visited July 18, 2003); Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal
Court and Its Implications for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 216 (2002) (noting that the
speedy ratifications “surpassed nearly everyone’s hopes” and represent “a remarkable and rapid development in
international law”)
23 Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 583, 585; Intervention
de M. Boualem Bouguetaia, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Algerie, Statement Before the Plenipotentiaries Conference of
the Establishment of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm (last visited Sept.
9, 2003); Dilip Lahiri, Head of Delegation of India, Explanation of Vote on the Adoption of the International Criminal Court
(July 17, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003); H.E. Mr. Muladi, Minister for Justice, Head of
Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, Statement Before the Plenipotentiaries Conference of the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court (June 16, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003); Judge Eli
Nathan, Head of Delegation of Israel, Statement on the Adoption of the International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), at
http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) Cf. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 29-51, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Ad
Hoc Committee Report] (revealing that these preferences were also expressed at the preliminary drafting stage)
24 Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Forty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/44/195 (1989);
see also Agenda Item 152, supra note 16.
25 Kaul, supra note 23, at 585 (noting that states other than those in the “like-minded group,” which included about 60 states,
either wanted a weak ICC or, in the case of Security Council members, and ICC controlled by the Security Council) India,
Mexico, Indonesia, and Japan were among the more vocal advocates of a weaker jurisdictional competence of the ICC. Id.
26 ICC Statute art. 17. Complementarity applies even where the UN Security Council refers a case to the ICC. Id. art. 13 (6)
22

8

Nationalizing International Criminal Law

(draft—please do not cite or circulate without permission)

Court’s purpose that States Parties included three references to it in the Rome Statute—in
the preamble, Article 1, and Article 17.27
Even as complementarity was entrenched in the Statute, however, the Court was
given the ultimate power to decide when it could admit a case to its docket. In other
words, the Court itself would make the final determination as to whether a country is
“unwilling” or “unable” to prosecute a case.28 Many states expressed concerns, both
before and during the Rome Conference, about the intrusion into national affairs that
might result from this arrangement.29 China and the United States urged that
admissibility determinations be made by domestic courts or possibly the Security
Council,30 or at a minimum, that the ICC have only limited discretion to assert jurisdiction
over a State's objection.31 Even as a fragile consensus developed about the ICC’s power to
decide admissibility, state delegates repeatedly emphasized that the ICC should admit
only extraordinary cases, where the national forum refuses to undertake the prosecution
of war crimes in good faith.32 The refrain of sovereignty concerns expressed in the debates
suggests that aggressive use of the ICC’s power to determine the admissibility of cases
would meet with resistance.
Debates at the Rome Conference reflect a cautious and restrained approach not
only with respect to the admissibility of cases, but also to drawing the boundaries of ICC
jurisdiction.33 As a result of this ambivalence, the statute does not provide for universal
Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery To Implement International Criminal Law, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 897 (2002) The duplication of the complementarity provision was not legally necessary, but rather
reflected states’ desire to ensure that international jurisdiction would not undermine state sovereignty. Id.; see also Statement
of I.E. Ayewah (Nigeria), U.N. GAOR, 50 th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR (1995) (“[W]e would have difficulties with the
statue if a hierarchy is established in which the ICC would be superior to national courts. Rather, recourse to the court
should only be in the absence of national jurisdiction.”)
28 ICC Statute art. 17.
29 Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 67,
69; Comments of United States to Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment Of An International Criminal Court, U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1/add.2 (1995) [hereinafter Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee]. (noting that
the draft statute “frequently fails to uphold” national jurisdiction"); Statement of H. Owada (Japan) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm.,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR (1995) (urging principal reliance upon national courts pursuant to
principle of “prosecute or extradite”); Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/50/SR (1995) ("Regrettably, [the complementarity principal] has not been fully implemented in the operative part
of the Statute and some provisions even appear to be contrary to the principle.")
30 Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., supra note 29, at 3.
31 Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 29, at 8-10, para 3.
32 Jeffrey L. Bleich, The International Criminal Court: Report of the ILA Working Group on Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 281 (1997); see also id. (citing ICC Committee Report at 9, para 43, which notes that States have “stressed that the
standards [for determining "availability" and "effectiveness"] were not intended to allow the international criminal court to
pass judgement on the operation of national courts in general.”)
33 Kaul, supra note 23, at 585.
27
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jurisdiction, meaning that the Court would not have the power to prosecute war criminals
who only temporarily find themselves on the territory of a state party. This exclusion was
made despite active lobbying by human rights activists who pointed out that that it gives
a free pass to “traveling tyrants.”34 Subject-matter jurisdiction is also limited to the most
serious international crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes—despite
strong voices for a more expansive list of covered offenses.35 And although the jurisdiction
of the Court now covers crimes committed during both international and internal armed
conflict, the provision on internal armed conflict was adopted over strong objections by,
among others, the Arab League states, China and India.36
Even as states parties ceded some of their penal powers to the ICC in Rome, they
refused to relinquish important sovereign prerogatives in administering criminal justice.
For example, the statute lacks provisions on amnesties, pardons, parole, and sentence
commutations. Various delegations argued “that the Statute should not permit the Court
to intercede in the administrative (parole) or political decision-making process (pardons,
amnesties) of a State.”37 As a result of this compromise, it is now arguably possible for a
state to convict, but then pardon an accused war criminal, without prompting ICC action.
Finally, states were also reluctant to grant the Court power in the area of
enforcement. The Court depends almost entirely on the cooperation of domestic
authorities to collect evidence and arrest suspects, yet it cannot directly sanction noncooperation.38 As some commentators have noted, the section on state cooperation with
the ICC “suggests that while the States of the world agree to the establishment of the
Court in principle, and even to its jurisdiction in theory, they are not willing to make the
concessions to international cooperation.”39
The negotiations were not the only stage at which states expressed reservations
about a powerful, wide-reaching ICC. After the Rome Treaty won approval by an
overwhelming majority and the ICC seemed a closer reality, sovereignty concerns
34 Sadat & Carden, supra note 5, at 414; see also Goldsmith, supra note 2 (“The most salient class of human rights violators
during the past century has been oppressive leaders who abuse their own people within national borders. Under the
traveling dictator exception, the ICC does not touch this class of offenders, even if they travel abroad.”)
35 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 23, at 11; Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 29, at 69.
36 Bilder & Brody, supra note 11, at 269.
37 El Zeidy, supra note 27, at 941.
38 ICC Statute art. 87 (7) (providing that the Court must refer findings of non-cooperation to the Assembly of States Parties,
or, where the Security Council referred the case, to the Security Council)
39 Sadat & Carden, supra note 5, at 444.
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persisted in many states. As the Rome Treaty came up for a vote of ratification in national
legislatures, reluctant policymakers needed assurances that ratification would not result
in their country’s relinquishing control over the prosecution of their fellow citizens.40
One such assurance has been the passage of domestic legislation that criminalizes
offenses within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. Although the Rome Statute
imposes no explicit duty on states parties to pass such legislation,41 the complementarity
provisions of the Statute have prodded signatory countries to incorporate prohibitions on
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity into their criminal statutes.42 By
adopting the relevant implementing legislation, countries are ensuring that the ICC will
not find them “unable” to prosecute international crimes and thus will not take away
from them the control over war crimes cases.43

40 Asian countries have been particularly reluctant to ratify the ICC Treaty. E.g., Goold at 2 (noting the continuing concerns
of Japan, an active participant in the Rome Conference, that the ICC might undermine Japanese sovereignty); Chris Patten
Speech, RAPID, Sept. 26, 2002 (noting a ratification “gap among Asian states”); Asian Campaign on the Rome Statute
Ratification, at http://www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/no_27/02romastatute.htm (last visited July 17, 2003) For evidence from
other countries, see Helen Durham, Australian Red Cross, International Criminal Court, at
http://www.redcross.org.au/newsroom_featurestories_icc_background.htm (last visited May 2, 2003) (Australia); Human
Rights Watch, Mexico: Ratification of ICC Overdue, at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/mexico-icc-ltr.htm (expressing
concern about Mexico’s lack of progress toward ratification and noting that “Mexico is not alone in finding that ratification
of the ICC raises serious juridical questions regarding state sovereignty”) (last visited July 17, 2003); Senado congelo estudio de
Tribunal Penal Internacional, EL MOSTRADOR, Apr. 9, 2002 (Peru) But see Roy S. Lee, An Assessment of the ICC Statute, 25
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 750, 750 (2002) (noting the increased goodwill toward the ICC project after the Rome Treaty was signed)
41 Parties have a duty to adapt their domestic laws to implement the cooperation obligations under Part 9 of the Statute.
Alain Pellet, Entry Into Force and Amendment of the Statute, in THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 145, 152. But states are not
under a legal obligation to implement other basic provisions of the Statute. Id. at 153 (“neither the signatory States nor even
the States Parties have any clear obligation to bring their domestic legislation into harmony with the basic provisions of the
Rome Statute.”); see also Bruce Broomhall, La Cour Penale Internationale: Directives pour l’adoption des lois nationales
d’adaptation, 13 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 122 (1999) (stating that there is no explicit obligation under the Rome Statute on
States Parties to prohibit in their national law the crimes falling within the Court’s competence)
42 Amnesty International, Implementation, at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/int_jus_icc_implementation (last
visited June 27, 2003) (listing fifteen countries that have enacted implementing legislation and twelve that have drafted such
legislation); ECOWAS-ICRC Seminar on the Ratification and Implementation of the ICC Statute, 29-31 January 2002 (noting
that Ghana and Senegal are in the process of passing implementing legislation prohibiting offenses proscribed by the Rome
Statute and encouraging other ECOWAS members to do the same); Human Rights Watch, The Status of ICC Implementing
Legislation (noting that Argentina, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger and Senegal have begun the
implementation process); http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/icc/implementing_icc-en.asp (providing links to the
implementing legislation of ten countries)
43 E.g., Benjamin Goold, Ratifying the Rome Statute: Japan and the International Criminal Court *1, at
http://www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/no_29/05japanandicc.htm (last visited May 2, 2003) (“Because Japanese law does not
currently provide for domestic prosecution for war crimes, there is concern within the government that should a . . .
Japanese citizen be accused of such crimes, Japan would be obliged to hand that individual over to the ICC for indictment.
Given that this is a situation the Japanese government is keen to avoid, the passing of emergency legislation is regarded as
an essential precursor to ratification of the Rome Statute and participation in the ICC.”); Asian Campaign on the Rome
Statute Ratification, supra note (noting that the “ratification of the Rome Statute by countries in Asia will certainly hinge on
the way domestic law are linked to the provisions of the treaty”); Helen Durham, Australian Red Cross, International
Criminal Court, at http://www.redcross.org.au/newsroom_featurestories_icc_background.htm (last visited May 2, 2003)
(“The ICC will not impact upon national sovereignty as Australia will have fully formed domestic legislation to allow the
prosecution of our own people within this country.”) See generally Progress Report on the Ratification and National
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The threat of international prosecutions had a similar effect on the German
government after World War I. Faced with the threat that the Allies would try alleged
German war criminals in special international military tribunals, Germany “passed new
legislation and assumed jurisdiction in order to be able to prosecute the selected offenders
under national law.”44 By contrast, the duty to enact implementing legislation under the
1949 Geneva Conventions went largely unheeded,45 because no international tribunal
existed that would assume jurisdiction where nation states failed to do so. The rapid
passage of implementing legislation is an indicator of the influence the ICC is already
exerting on domestic judicial processes, a topic discussed further in Part III. At the same
time, it confirms the determination of domestic authorities around the world to retain
control over the prosecution of their nationals.
C. U.S. Resistance to the ICC
The qualified support for the ICC from various participating states might not be a
great obstacle to the flourishing of the Court if the Court had the backing of the United
States. The United States has strongly opposed the idea of a powerful ICC, however.
The U.S. government was an active participant in the initial stages of the drafting
of the ICC Statute.46 Dissatisfied with the final version of the Rome Treaty, the United
States withdrew its support from the ICC, and the U.S. delegate voted against it.47 Before
he left office, however, President Bill Clinton reconsidered the decision to oppose the
Court and signed the Rome treaty. He reasoned that as a member of the ICC, the United

Implementing Legislation of the Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, International Human
Rights Law Institute, DePaul University (7th ed. 2001); International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic
Development and the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, International Criminal
Court: Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute (2000), at http://www.ichrdd.ca.
44 El Zeidy, supra note 27, at 872.
45 Dietrich Schindler, Book Review, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 158, 160 (1998) (noting that “it must be assumed that only a few states
have fully complied with these obligations”)
46 Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
381, 383 (2002)
47 There were six key objections: First, the statute included a provision for jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states;
second, it included a prosecutor with the power to initiate investigations on her own authority; third, the Statute did not
include a provision for a ten-year opt-out period from the court’s jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity;
fourth, the statute included the crime of aggression; fifth, it incorporated a resolution proposing that terrorism and drug
crimes be brought within the court's jurisdiction in the future; and finally, it prohibited reservations. See Sean D. Murphy,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: State Department Views on the Future for War Crimes
Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INTL. L. 482, 484 (2002)
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States would be better able to influence its development. Nonetheless, he was concerned
about the “significant flaws” remaining in the Rome Statute.48
Under the Bush administration, U.S. resistance to the ICC project has intensified.
Arguing that the Rome Statute is unconstitutional because it does not include many of the
rights guaranteed to American citizens by the Constitution, some members of Congress
introduced legislation to prohibit cooperation with the ICC.49 Moved by these arguments
and by concerns that the ICC may be used to prosecute U.S. military personnel for
political purposes, in 2002, the Bush Administration sent a letter to the United Nations
Secretary General stating that the United States “does not intend to become a party” to the
Rome Treaty and “has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31,
2000.”50 In August 2002, President Bush signed the legislation prohibiting U.S.
cooperation with the ICC.51 Since then, the Administration has negotiated numerous
bilateral agreements with states who are parties to the statute agreeing not to surrender
U.S. citizens to the ICC.52
Because of the sharp disagreement between Europe and the United States on the
reach of the ICC, the Court has become a symbol of Europe’s efforts to assert itself
internationally and to constrain American power. This may have had the effect of
unifying Europe behind the Court while hardening U.S. opposition to it. In the growing
divide between Europe and the United States, the Court itself is a likely casualty.
While the United States has been the most vocal opponent, other major powers
have also resisted the idea of a powerful ICC. China and India were among the countries
that voted against the treaty, and Russia has refused to ratify it.53 During the negotiations
of the Statute, these countries insisted on a strong regime of complementarity, and Russia,
China, France, and the United States (four of the five permanent Security Council
members) pushed for Security Council control over the Court, both in referring and
blocking cases going to the Court.54 Finally, Israel, Arab states, and sub-Saharan African
states (where many of the serious conflicts are occurring) were also reluctant to accept
Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Signs Treaty for World Court To Try Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A1.
Amann & Sellers, supra note 46, at 383.
50 ICC Statute, at Statement of Depositary Status n. 6.
51 James Podgers, Quest for Credibility: International Criminal Court Faces Startup Challenges, 88 ABA J. 16, 18 (Nov. 2002)
52 Id. at 18.
53 International Criminal Court, at http://www.icc-cpi.int (last visited July 18, 2003)
54 ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at 348; Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 29, at 71.
48
49
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various provisions of the Rome Statute and have consequently failed to sign or ratify the
Statute.55
D. The Result of Limited Support: A Weaker Court
No international institution with political capital as limited as that of the ICC is
likely to be powerful. The Court is particularly vulnerable because it relies heavily on the
goodwill of domestic authorities to enforce its mandates. The capacity of the Court to
command cooperation from states is so weak that it is very likely to undermine the
Court’s work.56
The ICC has no police force, so it depends on other states, particularly those with
powerful militaries, to arrest suspects and enforce its judgments. Furthermore, the ICC
prosecutor lacks subpoena powers and cannot collect evidence (e.g., compel witnesses,
conduct exhumations, or seize bank accounts and government documents) without the
cooperation of domestic authorities.57 In addition, the ICC cannot sanction States directly
for failure to comply with its orders; rather, it has to refer its findings of noncompliance to
the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council.58
The uneven record of states’ cooperation with international tribunals does not
bode well for the Court’s ability to attract the cooperation of domestic authorities. The ad
hoc tribunals for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) often saw their
requests for cooperation and even their orders go unheeded. The Yugoslav government
for a long time refused to surrender war criminals to The Hague, and the eventual
transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY resulted in massive protests and divisions
within the country.59 Even after the transfer of Milosevic, despite economic and political
pressure from the West, the Yugoslav government for awhile did not recognize the ICTY’s
legal status and denied it access to archives and documents.60 Rwanda has similarly
refused to cooperate with the ICTR on occasion. One notable example was the Rwandan
government’s protest in 1999 against the Tribunal’s release from custody—on procedural
See Wippman, supra note 5, at * 4.
Sadat & Carden, supra note 5, at 415.
57 ICC Statute art. 93; Sadat & Carden, supra note 5, at 416.
58 Where a state party refuses to cooperate with the Court, the Court may “refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties
or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.” ICC Statute art. 87 (7)
59 Goldsmith, supra note 2; Daniel Simpson, Milosevic Trial Leaves Most Serbs Cynical, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, A8.
60 Carlotta Gall, Hague Tribunal Chief Says Yugoslavia Still Isn’t Cooperating, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, A8.
55
56
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grounds—of a high-level suspect.61 More recently, the Rwandan government, which is
overwhelmingly Tutsi, again failed to respond to requests for cooperation from the ICTR
when the Tribunal began investigations into crimes committed by the Tutsi Rwandan
Patriotic Front.62
Lack of cooperation has extended beyond states whose nationals were being tried
by the international tribunals. Countries neighboring Rwanda have harbored fugitive war
criminals,63 and countries whose peacekeeping forces were on the ground in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia have, on occasion, been reluctant to send their nationals to testify before the
tribunals.64 For a long time, peacekeeping states were reluctant to order their forces to
capture war criminals who were still at large.65 Importantly, although the ICTR and ICTY
had jurisdictional primacy over domestic authorities, the Security Council failed to
sanction domestic authorities that refused to cooperate with the international tribunals.66
Many of the successes of the Tribunals came as a result of U.S. pressure on
uncooperative governments. American support was central to the arrest and surrender of
suspects in the former Yugoslavia. Through sustained diplomatic, military, and economic
pressure, the United States undermined Milosevic’s regime in Yugoslavia, paving the way
for the arrests and trials of Serb war criminals.67 In particular, the United States’ threat to
withhold U.S. and International Monetary Fund (IMF) aid to the successor regime in
Yugoslavia prompted Milosevic’s transfer to the ICTY.68 American diplomatic pressure
also got the Croatian government to cooperate with the ICTY.69 Without question, the lack

61 ICTR prosecutors had violated his rights to speedy trial by detaining him without trial for over one year. Emmanuel
Goujon, Rwanda Suspends Cooperation With Genocide Court Over Release, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 06, 1999.
62 UN Prosecutor Rallies UK Support To Investigate Rwandan Army, AFRICA NEWS, Dec. 3, 2002.
63 Goldstone, supra note 8, at 236 (noting that some African countries “were reluctant to cooperate in the arrest and transfer
of indictees to the Rwanda tribunal”); ICTR Worries About Hindering Arrest of Rwandan Genocide Suspects, XINHUA, Dec. 15,
2000 (citing ICTR Prosecutor as saying that the arrests of some indicted individuals are being hampered by two African
countries)
64 Remy Ourdan, La laborieuse invention d’une justice internationale, LE MONDE, June 18, 1998. The United States imposed
conditions on the way the testimony of its diplomats would be taken. Christopher Marquis, U.S. Seeks Safeguards on
Diplomats Testifying on Milosevic Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, A13.
65 ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES 252 (1997); Ourdan, supra note 64.
66 Bartram Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal
Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 433 (1998) (noting that the Security Council proved reluctant “to take stronger action to
arrest indictees and to sanction states that fail[ed] or refuse[d] to cooperate with the ICTY.”)
67 Goldsmith, supra note 2.
68 Id.
69 Chris Hedges, Zagreb Sends Croat to Trial in the Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997, at A11; Chris Hedges, 10 Bosnian Croats
Surrender to War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at A3.
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of political, financial and military support from the United States will be a significant
constraint on the ICC’s ability to function effectively.
The lack of enthusiasm for a powerful ICC might also affect the Court’s financing.
Under the final version of the ICC Statute, the ICC will be financed mainly by
contributions by states that are parties to the Rome Treaty (general UN funds are also
likely to be used, but primarily for cases referred by the Security Council)70 The support of
more affluent states will be essential for the effective functioning of the Court. Because of
the substantial dependence on states’ contributions, the ICC could be seriously
undermined by the withdrawal of funds by a major contributor. Consider the examples of
the Committee Against Torture and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: “While both were initially meant to be state supported, states’ failure to
pay their dues eventually led to financing from the regular U.N. budget” and thus to
underfunding.71 International tribunals are considerably more expensive than regular UN
agencies72 and as officials from the ICTR and ICTY have testified, the lack of funds can
seriously impede their work.73 The ICC could be similarly crippled without the support of
the United States.74
E. The Result of a Weaker Court: Multiple Sites of Interpretation and Enforcement
The inescapable fact of the ICC’s limited political capital means that other
institutions will retain a critical role in interpreting and enforcing human rights and
humanitarian law. Essentially, there are four broad possibilities of how international
criminal law could be implemented in the absence of a strong ICC.
First, the UN could create more ad hoc international tribunals based in The Hague
or another neutral location, like those established for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
70 ICC Statute art. 115. The Court could also utilize “additional funds” provided voluntarily by Governments, international
organizations, individuals, and corporations, but given the controversial nature of this provision, it is still unclear how and
to what extent such funds will be used. ICC Statute art. 116.
71 Pejic, supra note 7, at 328 (citing Codification Division of the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Possible Types of Relationship
Between the United Nations and a Permanent International Criminal Court 6-7 (Background Paper 1997))
72 The ICTY’s and ICTR’s budgets for 2002-2003 were about $ 223 million and $ 177 million, respectively, and the ICC is
projected to cost between $25 and 40 million in its initial years. Carola Hoyos & Nikki Tait, A Tough Case: The International
Criminal Court Becomes a Reality Today. But with Strong U.S. Opposition and Concerns About Funding, It Is in for a Difficult
Future, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at 18.
73 Graham T. Blewitt, National Prosecutions—International Lessons, in REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND
SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Christopher C. Joyner & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds. 1998)
74 Hoyos & Tait, supra note 72 (citing skeptic remarks by the U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes concerning the financing of
the Court)
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This solution, however, would seem to defeat the entire purpose of the ICC. Although the
Bush administration has expressed some support for this option,75 the UN administration
and most members do not favor it. In addition, although its powers will be limited, the
ICC will not disappear altogether. As long as it exists, it will seem peculiar to create new
ad hoc international tribunals, performing the same function as an already existing
bureaucracy.76
Second, national courts could continue to prosecute crimes committed on their
territory or by their nationals. These trials could arise under either international law or
domestic human rights and war crimes statutes. Although some national courts have been
lagging in their obligation to prosecute gross human rights violations, others have
vigorously pursued such trials. Compared to international prosecutions, local trials are
more efficient and rarely encounter serious enforcement problems. At the same time,
political pressure on local judges or a serious lack of resources can lead to unfair results.
Other countries, not connected to the crime, could also take up cases under
universal jurisdiction. Several European countries, with Belgium at the forefront, have
prosecuted international crimes on this basis.77 The universal jurisdiction approach,
however, is more problematic and less likely to be accepted than the ICC. It does not rest
on the consent of states with original jurisdiction over a case and neither its jurisdiction,
nor its laws and procedures have the imprimatur of the international community. In an
example of the opposition that such trials provoke, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(“DRC”) successfully challenged before the ICJ Belgium’s right to prosecute the former
DRC foreign minister under universal jurisdiction.78 More recently, the United States
threatened to move NATO headquarters out of Brussels unless Belgium amended its
universal jurisdiction statute.79

75 The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice or Show of Justice?: Before the House Comm. on Int’l
Relations, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S.
Department of State)
76 As this Article argues in Part II, international tribunals, because of their remoteness from the country where the crime was
committed, may also have less legitimacy and less impact on domestic efforts to promote reconciliation and rule of law.
77 Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and the Prosecution of War Crimes, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 393, 400-01 (Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000)
78 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Rep. of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. (Feb. 14)
79 Richard Bernstein, Belgium Rethinks Its Prosecutorial Zeal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, A8.
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Finally, mixed courts, composed of international and national judges, could
prosecute international crimes on the territory where those crimes occurred. Such courts
have already been created in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo, and have been
proposed for Cambodia and Iraq. They have been generally well received by the UN and
the countries affected by the crime, as well as by the United States. As Part III argues, they
could serve as a model for recreating the mandate of the ICC.
Whatever shape international justice takes and whatever place the ICC takes in it
(a topic to which I return in Part III), the Court must come to terms with the central role
that national institutions will continue to play.
II. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH A CENTRALIZED REGIME OF
ENFORCEMENT
For many who believe in vigorous enforcement of international criminal law, a
less powerful ICC is a cause for disappointment. It should not be. As this Part argues,
advancement of international criminal law through a single, centralized institution
presents both theoretical and practical problems. It is less likely to result in informed and
politically acceptable interpretations of international criminal law. It will also contribute
little to the process of reconciliation and judicial reconstruction in the countries affected
by international crimes.
A. The Centralized Model of the ICC
To understand the arguments in favor of a limited role for the ICC, it is necessary
first to examine the policy arguments in favor of a powerful court. Advocates of a strong
ICC argue that centralization leads to a more coherent jurisprudence and more effective
enforcement of humanitarian and human rights law. Many of them have disfavored a
strong complementarity regime, fearing that leaving the task of enforcement to national
courts would result in failure to prosecute war crimes.80 Proponents of a powerful ICC
have argued that “the rendering of justice is too important to be left to the whims of
80 Some have lamented the omission of universal jurisdiction, see Luigi Condorelli, La Cour Penale Internationale: Un Pas de
Geant, 103 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 16 (1999) (criticizing the ICC’s incomplete jurisdictional
system for lagging behind the current international law); others the absence of a provision declaring national amnesties
unacceptable, Christine Van den Wyngaert & Tom Ongena, Ne Bis in Idem Principle, Including the Issue of Amnesty, in 2 THE
ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 705, 728; and yet others have argued for ICC jurisdictional primacy, see Brown, supra note
66.
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governments that are prone to compromise either on enforcing the law against
perpetrators or on guaranteeing them due process.”81
Even where national courts might be able to take on war crimes prosecutions,
some international law scholars maintain that “international fora more readily fulfill
victims’ expectations for the ‘highest form of justice’”82 and are better at upholding the
‘rule of international law.’”83 The international justice system, these scholars maintain, can
count on the expertise of jurists who are better qualified, more impartial than judges
‘caught up in the milieu which is the subject of the trials,’ and better equipped to render
uniform justice.84 Because international tribunals are more likely than local courts to be
impartial, they are also more able to build ‘objective’ records of events.85
In addition to these functional advantages, the ICC is said to have an important
symbolic, norm-reinforcing value.86 By articulating and solidifying international norms
relating to armed conflict and human rights, the Court conveys “the sense that there is a
regulation of the international realm, a legitimate international law, and an international
law with shared threshold norms.”87 Some scholars have speculated that, by sending a
message that certain behavior will not be tolerated by the international community, a
permanent international criminal court would also serve a deterrent function.88 Finally, by
articulating a coherent set of rules and principles, the ICC would provide a template for
national authorities contemplating war crimes prosecutions. Over the long run, the
Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1998), cited in Alvarez, supra note 4, at 375.
Richard Goldstone, The United Nations’ War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment, 12 CONN. J. INT’L L. 227, 238 (1997)
83 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International
Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 2, 7 (1998)
84 STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-23,
184 (2001); Cassese, supra note 81, at 8-10 (noting that in comparison to national courts, international courts “are less
destabilizing to fragile governments, are less likely to cede to ‘short-term objectives of national politics.’”); Theodor Meron,
Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization?, 9 EUR. INT’L L. 18 (1998)
85 U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4161th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4161 (statement of Judge Claude Jorda); Cassese, supra note 83, at
9-10.
86 U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4063d mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4063 (1999); Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International
Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 237, 253 (1998) (observing that “rendering a human rights abuse an international crime
serves . . . a symbolic [purpose], as a statement of international concern about the severity of the act”)
87 Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 355, 387 (2002) Geoffrey Robertson
identifies in similar terms one of the greatest contributions of the Nuremberg judgment: “[The crimes committed by the
Nazis] were not . . . crimes against Germans (which therefore only Germans should punish); they were crimes against
humanity, because the very fact that a fellow human being could conceive and commit them diminishes every member of
the human race.” ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at 220.
88 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3119 (1992); UN Rights Chief, ICRC Welcome ICC But Urge More
Members, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 11, 2003 (citing both UN high commissioner for human rights and ICRC for
proposition that ICC will deter war criminals); Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM.
RTS. Q. 737 (1999)
81
82
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Court’s rulings would be accepted by national communities and incorporated into
domestic law.89
The aspirations of this centralized model of enforcement are universalist. The
International Criminal Court is expected to advance a body of law that is applicable
uniformly around the globe and is wholly independent from the context in which its
subjects are situated. 90 To achieve the coherence and broad universality required by this
conception of international law, the Court’s judgments must take precedence over diverse
local interpretations of humanitarian law and human rights principles. The top-down
model views variation in interpretation and enforcement at the national level with
skepticism. Decentralization is spurned because it is likely to lead to fragmentation and
incoherence.91
On a closer look, however, top-down theories of international prosecutions seem
to rest on a series of overstated claims. David Wippman has argued persuasively that the
deterrent effect of international trials is at best minimal.92 Jose Alvarez has pointed out
that the impartiality and record-building function of international tribunals has often been
exaggerated.93
Three more critiques of the centralized model are explored in the Sections below.
The first is that international criminal tribunals often fail to deliver judgments that are
tested and informed by diverse perspectives, particularly the perspectives of those most
affected by the tribunals’ decisions. The second is that the results of international
prosecutions hardly foster the internalization of international norms and may in fact
engender backlash by local communities. The third, related to the first two critiques, is

Investigations, prosecutions, and civil cases initiated at the national level (albeit in third countries) were undoubtedly
influenced by the work of the ICTY and ICTR. E.g., Marlise Simons, Pinochet’s Spanish Pursuer: Magistrate of Explosive Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at A1 (noting that the investigating judge who brought charges in Spain against Chilean dictator
Augusto Pinochet was indebted to the work of the ICTY and ICTR)
90 The universalist model is part of a larger movement toward the establishment of a global regime of the rule of law. As
Ruti Teitel has observed, “More and more, a depoliticized legalist language of right and wrongs, duties and obligations, is
supplanting the dominant political language based on state interests, deliberation, and consensus.” Teitel, supra note 87, at
355, 372.
91 Cf. Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 267 (2001);
Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 105, 134
(1998)
92 David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473 (1999); Wippman,
supra note 5, at * 9-18.
93 Alvarez, supra note 5.
89
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that international trials, far from the place where the crimes occurred, do little to promote
post-conflict reconciliation and the rebuilding of the rule of law.

B. The Problem with Insularity: Weaker Claims to a Legitimate Mandate of
Interpreting the Law
While international law scholars are happy to focus on the uniformity and
universality of ICC decisions, those outside the international law community often have a
different perspective. They are more likely to regard ICC judgments as one-sided or
uninformed interpretations of complex issues at the intersection of local politics, morality,
and law.
International criminal law is still full of gaps and ambiguities, and the ICC will
inevitably have to make difficult policy and moral judgments when interpreting and
applying the law. 94 The open-ended nature of many international criminal law principles
raises serious questions about the way in which international norms should be debated
and decided.95 It is not clear that the ICC has a legitimate mandate to make these decisions
on its own, without meaningful involvement of the states and populations most affected
by the Court’s decisions.
Consider several examples of potentially controversial determinations that the ICC
judges will have to make:
[R]elative to the war crime of excessive incidental death, injury, or damage:
are countries with the resources to use precision-guided munitions obliged
to use those weapons, in order to minimize collateral damage, rather than
using the much less expensive ordinary kinetic weapons? . . . Relative to the
crime of genocide: what is the mens rea required for command responsibility
for genocide? Where the commander knows of his subordinate’s genocidal
intent, but does not entertain that mens rea himself, does he have the
necessary mens rea for a conviction for genocide? 96
What constitutes proportionality and necessity in military action, a determination
that is fundamental to deciding whether certain actions qualify as war crimes, is also

Madeline Morris, The Democratic Dilemma of the International Criminal Court, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 591, 597-98 (2002)
See Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 73, 136 (1995)
96 Id.
94
95
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bound to entail policy judgments.97 So are distinctions between military and civilian
targets.98 “Even elementary concepts such as accessory liability or duress cannot be
divorced from the implicit construction of moral theories as to what constitutes
blameworthy human conduct under extreme circumstances of mass violence. . . .”99
Finally, sentencing determinations might also prove controversial, particularly when out
of sync with national punishments.100
The Court will rarely find much support in statutory text for the many difficult
decisions it will have to make.101 The six official languages in which the Statute was
written will further complicate textualist readings.102 Nor will the judges have a solid base
of precedent to guide them in their interpretation of the Statute. The jurisprudence on
crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes is largely limited to the judgments of
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and the ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and
Yugoslavia. The difficulty that the ICC Preparatory Commission had in writing the
Elements of Crimes (which are to serve as nonbinding interpretive guidelines to judges) is
a reflection of the scarcity of authoritative sources and agreement on the content of
international criminal law.103
Given the limited agreement on the content and scope of international criminal
law, it is not surprising that the ICC’s mandate to interpret and enforce that law has
already been contested. The challenge to the ICC’s legitimacy and authority has three
dimensions. First, commentators have pointed out that few structural checks exist to
ensure that the Court’s power is being used fairly and consistently.104 Second, some
ICC Statute art. 8 (2) (b) (iv); ICC Elements of Crimes art. 8 (2) (b) (iii); Ruth Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2001, at 193, 194.
98 Wedgwood, supra note 97, at 194.
99 Akhavan, supra note 5, at *9.
100 See infra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
101 The Elements of Crimes, which were meant to provide more detailed guidance, are not binding on the judges. ICC
Statute art. 9. The United States submitted a proposal that would have made them binding, but it was rejected.
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.69 (14 July 1998), cited in Philippe Kirsch & Valerie Oosterveld, The Post-Rome Preparatory Commission, in
THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 93, 97.
102 ICC Statute art. 128 (stating that the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish versions of the Statute are
equally authentic)
103 Kirsch & Oosterveld, supra note 101, at 98. (“The second obstacle was that such a document had never before been
elaborated in international law. While some crimes had been examined by the Nuremberg, Tokyo, former Yugoslav, and
Rwandan international criminal tribunals, many crimes had not. Even in those cases where crimes had been discussed, their
elements were often unclear.”)
104 U.S. policymakers and commentators have expressed concern over the wide scope of discretion that the ICC prosecutor
enjoys under the Rome Statute. See Chris Lombardi, Hot Seat, 89 A.B.A. J. 16 (2003); Will, supra note 3. The prosecutor can
open investigations on her own initiative, without any external oversight. The prosecutor’s actions are subject to review by
97

22

Nationalizing International Criminal Law

(draft—please do not cite or circulate without permission)

scholars have persuasively argued that the Court cannot base its legitimacy exclusively on
state consent, because it can exercise its jurisdiction over nationals of states that are not
parties to the ICC Treaty.105 And third--the point on which I focus in this Section--the
insularity of the Court from diverse local opinions puts in question the extent to which the
Court’s interpretations of international criminal law could be informed and legitimate.
When American commentators have charged the ICC with being unaccountable,
they have usually focused on the lack of checks and balances in the Court’s structure.106 In
particular, they have expressed concern about the lack of meaningful constraints on the
prosecutor’s powers.107 The ICC prosecutor is said to have a wide scope of discretion
because she can open investigations on her own initiative, without any external oversight.
There are no guidelines that could limit ex ante prosecutorial screening and charging
decisions.108 Although the prosecutor’s actions are subject to review by a three-judge
panel of ICC judges, and to a lesser extent, to the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC,109
the U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference argued that these constraints are not sufficient
and that the consent of interested states should be required to authorize an investigation.
Although American critics have focused less on the scope of judicial discretion, it
is easy to see how the argument about lack of accountability would extend to judicial
actions. The point is not that judges should be directly responsible to an electorate, at the
national or international level. Courts serve important countermajoritarian functions.110
They derive their legitimacy to a great extent from principled and reasoned decision
making and from their impartiality.111 But perhaps in recognition of the tenuous nature of

a three-judge ICC pre-Trial Chamber, which must find a reasonable basis for investigation. ICC Statute art. 15 (4) By
contrast, during the drafting and negotiation of the ICC Treaty, some states, including the United States, suggested that the
prosecutor should have the consent of interested states before proceeding with an investigation. 1995 Ad Hoc Committee
Report, supra note 23, at para. 25.
105 Morris, supra note 94.
106 Cf. John Bolton, Toward an International Criminal Court? A Debate, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 159, 164 (2000) (observing that
the Court is “not part of any ordered structure of accountability”)
107
See, e.g., John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, The United States and the
International Criminal Court, Remarks to the Federalist Society (Nov. 14, 2002), at http://www.state.gov.
108
Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal
Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 510-11 (2003)
109
Id. at 524-25 (2003) (noting that the Assembly of States Parties is unlikely to act as a strong check on the ICC Prosecutor
and that judicial review, “while exerted at every level of prosecutorial decisionmaking, does not extend to judging the
wisdom of prosecutorial actions”)
110 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980)
111
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 312-13 (1997) [AU: add sources].
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such legitimacy, at the national level, additional safeguards have been placed on judicial
decision making. The system of checks and balances ensures that legislatures can rewrite
a statute when they believe the judges interpreting the statute have overstepped their
mandate.112
Yet no international legislature exists that could revise the ICC’s interpretations of
international criminal law when these interpretations are out of sync with statutory text,
legislative intent, or majority preferences. The Assembly of State Parties, which does have
the power to amend the ICC Statute and Elements of Crimes, is a poor substitute for a
legislature.113 The Assembly delegates are usually career civil servants in their respective
country’s executive branch and already several degrees removed from the popular will.114
As other commentators have already observed, the Assembly is likely to be torn by
internal disputes and ineffective as an oversight mechanism.115 Moreover, because the
Assembly will make decisions by a majority or super-majority vote, the preferences of
one-third or more of the member states, including the states most affected by the Court’s
decisions, can be ignored in the final Assembly decisions.116 Although we accept majority
vote in domestic politics, at the international level, where decisionmaking is several
degrees removed from the popular will, state consent is still considered by many to be
essential to adequate representation.117
The ICC, however, cannot base its legitimacy exclusively on state consent. The
Court has the power to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of states that are not parties to

112 Karen Alter makes much the same point in a recent paper. Karen Alter, Delegation to International Courts: Four
Varieties and Their Implications for State-Court Relations 52 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
113 Given the important check that the Assembly could provide, however, it is not surprising to see that the United States—
the main proponent of greater accountability of the ICC—has been pushing for a greater role by the Assembly in the Court’s
decisionmaking structure.
114 Cf. Robert A. Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 23, 32 (1994)
(observing the lack of democratic process in transnational structures where “decisions are made by unelected delegates
appointed by national governments, many of which, and in some cases most of which, are not themselves dependent on
elections”); Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 491 (2001)
(observing that intergovernmental organizations [IGOs] are seen as undemocratic because they are run “by an elite group of
national officials who are instructed by their respective executives, and by international secretariats whose staffs at times act
independently of the top IGO management”)
115
Danner, supra note 109, at 524; see also HAROLD K. JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 119 (1984) (observing that
“representative bodies [of international institutions] often find it hard to frame coherent policies)
116 This will not be as large a problem with respect to amendments of the substantive definitions of crimes, however,
because such amendments will not be binding on the states that vote against them. ICC Statute art. 121 (4)
117 Morris, supra note 94; Trimble, supra note. This is a problem inherent in international governance more generally: As the
scale of government increases, the opportunities for citizen participation decrease. See Dahl, supra note 114, at 29-39. [Cite
debates about the legitimacy of supranational governance among EU scholars].
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the Rome Statute, as long as the state on whose territory the crime occurred consents. In
Madeline Morris’s terms, “[t]here is no democratic linkage between the ICC and those
non-party nationals over whom it would exercise authority.”118
Some scholars have even begun to question the sufficiency of state consent for
legitimizing the actions of international institutions. Given the limited opportunities that
an individual state or even a group of states have to sanction an international institution
that acts outside its own mandate, national communities have no meaningful “voice” in
the oversight of international institutions.119 As a remedy to this problem, scholars have
called for participation by national elected delegates in the governance of international
institutions.120 Some have even suggested holding national referenda on major issues
facing an international organization.121 While these suggestions are important in giving
national constituencies a voice in the governance and lawmaking of international
organizations, they would not apply to the adjudicative functions of institutions like the
ICC.
As this Article argues, however, there are ways in which international
adjudication can be anchored more closely to national democratic processes. First, the
Court itself could exercise deference to local norms in its jurisprudence. Similar
suggestions have been made in discussing ways to legitimize the World Trade
Organization’s judicial functions: “In the adjudication process, when facing a claim that
national legislation restricts trade contrary to the Agreement, the panel should reject the
claim of illegality . . . when ‘the national measure reflects a deeply embedded value
(which at times may be idiosyncratic)’ and ‘enjoy[s] the clear support of [that country’s]
population.’”122 Conscious of its tenuous democratic link to national constituencies, the

118 Madeline Morris, Lacking a Leviathan: The Quandaries of Peace and Accountability, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note at
135, 138. But see Michael Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-Party States, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 213 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) (arguing that the ICC’s jurisdiction over
nationals of non-party states is well grounded in international law)
119
But see Danner, supra note 109, at 524 (positing a model of “pragmatic accountability” of the ICC Prosecutor, where states
can exercise oversight over the Prosecutor through their choices whether or not to cooperate with her)
120 Stein, supra note 114, at 532.
121 Id.
122 Jefferey Atik, Identifying Antidemocratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice and International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 229, 234, 261 (1998), cited in Stein, supra note, at.505.
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European Court of Human Rights also grants national authorities a “margin of
appreciation” when evaluating the legality of their practices.123
An even more direct way of ensuring the accountability and legitimacy of the
International Criminal Court is the mixed-court model advocated in this Article. The ICCas-mixed-court would engage national judges and prosecutors, alongside their ICC
counterparts, in the development and enforcement of international criminal law. Because
these officials are more likely to be attuned to the interests and preferences of local
populations, their involvement will be an important step in increasing the local legitimacy
of the Court. As the next Section elaborates, holding mixed-court proceedings on the
territory where the crimes were committed would be another way to connect the Court’s
operations to domestic political processes. (Even as it involves local officials and holds its
proceedings “on the ground,” the Court could maintain the necessary degree of
impartiality and international legitimacy through its continued reliance on a corps of
international investigators, prosecutors, and judges.)
The mixed-court model is more legitimate in yet another sense—it encourages
deliberation among diverse participants and thus is more likely to produce informed
decisions. As deliberative democratic theorists have argued, the airing of conflicting
opinions is essential to correct judgments, in both politics and law.124 Deliberation among
diverse participants offers “the conditions whereby actors can widen their own limited
and fallible perspectives by drawing on each other’s knowledge, experience and
capabilities.”125 On this account, truth and legitimacy are discovered in the interaction and
communication among individuals of diverse backgrounds and experiences.
The current ICC structure does not promote this deliberative democratic ideal. The
Court is located in The Hague, far from the places where most of the conflicts it
adjudicates are likely to occur. It has a limited number of judges, and the judges’
relatively uniform training and outlook on international law narrows the range of
See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 58 (1859) (“Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the
reconciling and combining of opposites that very few have minds sufficiently capacious an impartial to make the
adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants
fighting under hostile banners.”); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 50-68 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1979) (arguing that deliberation is a means for discovering the truth); Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of
Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671 (1990)
125 Graham Smith & Corinne Wales, Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy, 48 POL. STUD. 51, 53–54 (2000); see also
Iontcheva, supra note 4, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 339-343 (2003)
123
124
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opinions likely to be represented at the Court.126 The judges’ likely lack of appreciation for
the diversity of opinions about the content of international criminal law might
compromise the legitimacy of the Court’s verdicts.
Applying the insights of deliberative democrats, we may want to diversify the
personnel of the ICC and involve judges and prosecutors from the communities most
affected by the decisions of the ICC.127 These individuals are particularly likely to enrich
the discourse about international criminal law by bringing to bear their unique
experiences of living and working in a post-conflict society. The benefits of democratic
deliberation may also accrue in interactions among institutions--for example, in an
ongoing dialogue among national and international courts, or among mixed courts and an
overarching international criminal appeals chamber.128 Whereas a sole international
criminal tribunal would tend to reinforce the already existing consensus among
international lawyers, multiple venues for the pursuit of international criminal justice, at
the national and international level, may encourage a more constructive debate among
conflicting perspectives.129 Arguments about subsidiarity in the European Union and
federalism in the United States, which emphasize the importance of “laboratories of
experimentation” in developing and enforcing the law, echo the same insights. 130
The status of the death penalty in international criminal law provides a good
illustration of the importance of deliberation among diverse participants. An
overwhelming majority of international lawyers agrees that the death penalty should not
be available in international tribunals.131 This view prevailed during the Rome

Although more than half of the eighteen judges are supposed to be specialists in criminal, rather than international law,
fifteen of the current eighteen judges have extensive training and practice in international law. Only a few of the judges
come from countries that have recently gone through a period of massive human rights abuses.
127 The Court could also involve lay participants as jurors. Contrary to conventional wisdom, both common law and civil
law systems around the world use jurors in their proceedings, often alongside professional judges in mixed-court
proceedings. Because such a reform would require a radical reconsideration and rewriting of the ICC Statute, however, it is
not considered at length here.
128 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization [AU][on transnational judicial dialogue].
129 Cf. Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 700 (arguing that the multiplicity of international tribunals promotes “experimentation and
exploration, which can lead to improvements in international law”)
130 E.g., Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003);
Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLÄNDISHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 240 (1996) [AU] [add sources on federalism].
131 Cf. William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797, 799 (1998);
Geoffrey Robertson expresses a widely shared sentiment when he argues that “[t]he most notable achievement of the
penalty provisions [in the ICC Statute] is to eschew the death sentence.” ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at 361.
126

27

Nationalizing International Criminal Law

(draft—please do not cite or circulate without permission)

negotiations, despite the opposition by countries that maintain the death penalty for
ordinary crimes.132 Outside the narrow circle of international lawyers, however, many
jurists and non-legal scholars continue to find reasonable grounds on which to support
the death penalty.133 And in many states across the world (including some of those who
have abolished capital punishment), a majority of people supports the death penalty, even
for ordinary crimes. As the insistence of many Rwandans on the death penalty for
genocidaires indicates, this number is likely to be greater when it comes to crimes such as
genocide and crimes against humanity.134 It is not difficult to see how it would be
reasonable, on proportionality and retributive grounds, to demand the death penalty for a
Hitler or a Pol Pot, particularly when common murderers continue to be executed in
many countries around the world. After all, the same European states that now protest
the imposition of the death penalty did not think twice about hanging the Nazi criminals
convicted at Nuremberg. (The British government did not even want to bother with trials,
but favored just shooting the Nazis) At the International Criminal Court, however, such
debates about the death penalty have been foreclosed because of the solid consensus
among international judges on the issue.
C. The Problem with Distant Prosecutions: Domestic Resistance
The Court’s distance from the communities affected by international crimes is also
likely to impair its political acceptability within those communities. Evidence from other
human rights regimes suggests that if the Court attempts to impose its mandates in a
heavy top-down fashion and is not attuned to local political processes and preferences, it
may provoke resistance and even a counter-reaction to international norms and practices.

See Discussion Turns to Range and Definition of Penalties in Draft Statute in Preparatory Committee on International
Criminal Court, at 1, U.N. Press Release L/2805 (Aug. 22, 1996) (noting that some delegates from states with a
predominantly Muslim population argued that “if the statute [were] to be considered representative of all systems . . ., it
should include the death penalty”) A major reason for excluding the death penalty was a strong insistence for that exclusion
by the European states, which have constitutional provisions prohibiting them from extraditing a suspect if he or she might
face the death penalty in the country making the extradition request. Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 29, at 86.
133 Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-51 (1983); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Callins v. Collins (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002); GERARD
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 355 (1995); Walter Berns, The Morality of Anger, in PUNISHMENT AND
THE DEATH PENALTY: THE CURRENT DEBATE (Stuart E. Rosenbaum & Robert M. Baird eds. 1995); Christie Davis, Safely
Executed, in id.; Ernest van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, in id.
134 PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 131, 245-46
(1998); James C. McKinley, Jr., Ex-Rwandan Premier Gets Life in Prison on Charges of Genocide in ’94 Massacres, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1998, at A4.
132
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The history of the ad hoc tribunals reveals that the remoteness of international
tribunals damages their legitimacy and effectiveness with local populations. In the former
Yugoslavia, the ICTY has been perceived as a distant and often biased135 tribunal with
little relevance to the reconciliation process in the countries of the region.136 Serbs, Croats,
and Bosnians have learned about the Tribunal from piecemeal headline reports from the
Hague and are thus “out of touch with the court’s day-to-day proceedings.”137 Even legal
professionals admit they do not understand the ICTY procedures, because of the distance
of the Tribunal and because of its unique blend of civil and common law procedures.138
Given the limited access that local populations have to the Hague-based Tribunal,
it is not surprising to find that the Tribunal’s image in the former Yugoslavia is less than
perfect. “Most Croats and Serbs view[] the Tribunal as utterly biased against their
communities, and as more than willing to turn a blind eye to atrocities committed by
Bosniaks [sic].”139 Indicted Serbs and Croats have been hailed as heroes by some in their
home countries,140 while support for cooperation with the ICTY remains minimal.141 At the
same time, “large parts of the Bosniak community [are] disappointed by the Tribunal”
and see it “as a cynical gesture to salve the guilty conscience of the West.”142
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has also been critiqued for its
remoteness from the place where the crimes that it judges took place.143 Hearing about the

Justin Brown, World, Facing Up to Atrocities?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16, 1999, at 6; INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW CLINIC, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 29-33 (2000)
(citing interviews with Bosnian Serb and Croat judges who accused the ICTY of lacking independence and impartiality)
[hereinafter JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY].
136 Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide Adequate Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA
J. INT’L COMP. L. 353, 355 (2001) Perhaps in recognition of the need to engage local judiciaries to a greater extent, the ICTY
recently adopted Rule 11bis, which permits the referral of a case under indictment to the authorities of a state of which the
accused is a national or where the crime was committed. ICTY R. PROC. & EVID., R. 11bis (a), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm.
137 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WAR CRIMINALS IN BOSNIA’S REPUBLIKA SRPSKA 75 (2000)
138
JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 135, at 34.
139 Sandra Coliver, The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to Reconciliation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 19, 20 (2000), cited in Wippman, supra note 5, at *19.
140 Peter S. Green, A Fugitive Croatia General Is a Hometown Favorite, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003.
141 Steven Erlanger, Did Serbia’s Leader Do the West’s Bidding Too Well?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003 (reporting that only 12 % of
Serbs support extraditions of Serb suspects to the Hague)
142 Coliver, supra note 139, at 21.
143 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: External Perceptions of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, 26-FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21, 29 (2002); Remy Ourdan, Un tribunal loin de Rwanda, LE MONDE, Apr. 4,
1998 (reporting that few Rwandans follow the ICTR’s work)
135
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ICTR from sparse radio broadcasts, most Rwandans view the ICTR as an “inherently
foreign” institution that has “forfeited any impact on Rwandan society.”144
Local governments and communities have also complained about the
discrepancies between their needs and concerns and the international tribunals’ priorities.
Both Rwandans and Bosnians have expressed disappointment with the slow pace of the
tribunals’ work.145 Some Rwandans have also complained about the extraordinary (by
Rwandan standards) procedural protections afforded to defendants.146 Most
controversially, many Rwandans, including government officials, have expressed
frustration with the work of the ICTR, because the tribunal does not apply the death
penalty to the high-level officials it convicts of genocide, even as many lower-level
executioners of the genocide get the death penalty in Rwandan courts.147 As one Rwandan
official wryly observed, “it doesn’t fit our definition of justice to think of the authors of
the Rwandan genocide sitting in a full service Swedish prison with a television.”148
The Tribunal has also been criticized for failing to treat victims with sufficient
respect. This latter disagreement became so serious that Rwandan victims’ rights
organizations began urging Rwandans not to testify before or cooperate with the Court.149
The recent removal of Carla del Ponte from her position as chief prosecutor of the
Rwandan tribunal was also spurred on by the Rwandan government’s dissatisfaction
with the ICTR’s policies.150
Recent evidence of states’ withdrawal from a regional human rights regime also
suggests that when an international tribunal attempts to dictate the law from above, while
disregarding local preferences and enforcement capabilities, it is unlikely to be successful

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: JUSTICE DELAYED 24 (2001)
Remy Ourdan, La laborieuse invention d’une justice internationale, LE MONDE, June 18, 1998 (noting victims’
disappointment with the slow pace of ICTR proceedings) Rwanda’s representative to the UN General Assembly pointed
out in 1999 that while the ICTR had only indicted 48 individuals and tried and sentenced only four of them, Rwandan
courts have issued more than 20,000 indictments, held 1989 trials, and accepted 17,847 guilty pleas. David Wippman,
Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 482 (1999) (citing statement of Joseph
Mutaboba)
146 Remy Ourdan, supra note 145.
147 GOUREVITCH, supra note 134, at 245-46; McKinley, Jr., supra note 134, at A4; Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent
Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 371 (1997)
148 GOUREVITCH, supra note 134, at 255, cited in Wippman, supra note 5, at *14.
149 Stephen Smith, En jugeant le diable, le tribunal d’Arusha joue sa credibilite, LE MONDE, Apr. 4, 2002 (noting that Ibuka, a
Rwandan victims’ organization, no longer cooperates with the ICTR because it believes that the ICTR does not do enough to
protect testifying victims)
150 Felicity Barringer, Annan Is Said To Want New Prosecutor for Rwanda War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, A11.
144
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over the long run. In the late 1990s, three Caribbean states—Guyana, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Jamaica, withdrew from several international human rights treaties, largely
as a result of an overly demanding interpretation of the Caribbean states’ human rights
obligations by the region’s highest appellate court, the Privy Council (located in
London)151 After the Privy Council broadly interpreted the meaning of the international
prohibition on “degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment,” all Caribbean states
found themselves saddled with new obligations in imposing the death penalty. Because
they did not have the resources to fulfill their newly imposed duties, the affected
countries could take one of three courses: stop imposing capital punishment, flout their
international human rights obligations, or outright denounce those obligations. Guyana,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica (the three states with the highest number of capital
cases and the greatest resource problem) chose the third option and withdrew from the
relevant international human rights treaties.152
The Caribbean countries’ treaty denunciations demonstrate how an international
court can provoke resistance to its mandates when it attempts to change by judicial fiat
the treaty obligations of a state within its jurisdiction.153 Particularly where the new
obligations conflict with deeply held social norms (in the case of the Caribbean countries,
in favor of capital punishment), international tribunals that proceed too fast and over
strong objections by local constituencies are likely to see their authority challenged.154

D. The Problem with Local Non-Involvement: Inability to Achieve Reconciliation and
Rebuild the Rule of Law
Remote international prosecutions may also be less adept at promoting national
self-reckoning and reconciliation in the aftermath of a violent conflict. To achieve the
cathartic and reconciliation benefits of war crimes trials, nations must themselves take on
war crimes trials.155 The exercise of jurisdiction over war crimes allows a country to come

151 Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash
Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002)
152 Id.
153 The Court may do that by “adding new obligations, specifying existing obligations with greater particularity, or
strengthening mechanisms for review and enforcement.” Id. at 1855.
154 As Dan Kahan has argued in the domestic context, “If the law condemns too severely—if it tries to break the grip of the
contested norm (and the will of its supporters) with a ‘hard shove’—it will likely prove a dead letter and could even
backfire.” Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 609 (2000)
155 Alvarez, supra note 5.
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to terms with its past and to demonstrate the power of the judicial system to “domesticate
chaos.”156 The assertion of jurisdiction is an indispensable part of a community’s healing
process.157 Because local trials are more extensively covered in the media and easier to
attend and follow by the local population, they are more likely to stimulate public
discussion and to “foster the liberal virtues of tolerations, moderation, and civil
respect.”158 For all these reasons, such trials are essential to the rebuilding of a system
based on the rule of law.
Commentaries in the media in countries dealing with post-conflict justice confirm
the links between local trials, public debate, reconciliation, and societal “healing.” When
South Korea tried its own dictators Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo on charges of
mutiny and treason for staging a coup and murdering about 200 student protesters, South
Koreans followed the proceedings closely. One journalist reports that “[t]he trial has been
viewed by many South Koreans less as a hearing on the specific crimes committed more
than a decade ago by aging military leaders than as a pivotal step toward the
establishment of the rule of law by a country trying to cleanse itself of its brutal and
corrupt past.”159 Similarly, recent trials in France of Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier,
officials in the Vichy government during World War II, provided “psychotherapy on a
nationwide scale”160 and became “the vehicle for debate on the legitimacy and activities of
the Vichy regime.”161 In Argentina, during the trials of military officials for murders and
“disappearances” of leftist activists in the 1970s, “all the media gave ample coverage to an
event that was discussed in squares and cafes, by poor and rich alike. Through this
discussion, a public space was appropriated, a voice rediscovered . . . . It seemed as
though common people would be able at last to come to terms with their own experiences

156 Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV 311, 432-33 (2002); see also Bill Keller, Digging Up the
Dead, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2003 (arguing that trying some war criminals on their own would let Iraqis “reclaim a measure of
national honor”)
157 Berman, supra note 156, at 433 (noting that the Barbie trial had that effect on France); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY,
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1997) (describing war crimes trials as constructing the “collective memories that may
help cleanse both victims and perpetrators, indeed whole nations, of their brutal past”)
158 OSIEL, supra note 157, at 2.
159 Id. at 6.
160 HENRY ROUSSO, THE VICHY SYNDROME: HISTORY AND MEMORY IN FRANCE SINCE 1944, at 210 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
1991) (quoting French historian Emmanuel Le Roy Laudrie), cited in OSIEL, supra note 157, at 14.
161 Leila S. Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier for Crimes Against Humanity in France, 20 LAW AND
SOC. INQUIRY 191, 191 (1995), cited in OSIEL, supra note 157, at 14.
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of fear, silence, and death.”162 Finally, the Eichmann trial in Israel “compelled an entire
nation to undergo a process of self-reckoning and overwhelmed it with a painful search
for its identity.”163
When an international tribunal takes away from states the opportunity to face the
past through criminal trials, it impedes their progress toward reconciliation and
reconstruction of a society built on the rule of law. Consider the record of the ad hoc
international criminal courts. Unlike the trials in France, Argentina, Israel, and South
Korea, ICTR and ICTY trials were not as widely covered in the local media nor as closely
followed by the affected local populations. Nor have the ICTY and ICTR aided local
judiciaries to undertake war crimes prosecutions and to lead the country on the road to
reconciliation and a rule of law society.
For a long time, the ICTY all but ignored national judiciaries in the former
Yugoslavia, deeming them biased and thus unfit to hold trials consistent with
international standards of due process. Even as the Court developed the Outreach
Program, designed to raise publicity in the region about its own work, it made no
systematic attempt to impart its legal and technical expertise on local judges or to engage
these judges in cooperative proceedings.164 As one former ICTY official bemoaned, while
the international community has spent millions of dollars on the Tribunal in The Hague, it
has put surprisingly little effort and money into legal reform in the former Yugoslavia.165
Bosnian judges themselves have expressed frustration at their marginalization in this
process166. Unsurprisingly, the “tribunal’s long-term impact on the systems of justice in
the area of conflict has been minimal.”167 As a result, “there is virtually no effective

Carina Perelli, Memoria de Sangre: Fear, Hope, and Disenchantment in Argentina, in REMAPPING MEMORY 39, 49-50
(Jonathan Boyarin ed., 1994), cited in OSIEL, supra note 157, at 14-15. While Carlos Menem eventually pardoned the military
officers who had been convicted by Argentinean courts under his predecessor, Raul Alfonsin, this act does not negate the
importance of national trials. A testament to the awareness-raising potential of this process are the most recent elections in
Argentina, in which Nestor Kirchner came to power partly thanks to his promise to reopen trials for crimes committed
during the dirty war. Larry Rohter, Now the Dirtiest of Wars Won’t Be Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, A4.
163 Haim Gouri, Facing the Glass Booth, in HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE: THE SHAPES OF MEMORY 153, 155 (Geoffrey H.
Hartman ed., 1994); see also TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 351 (1993) (observing that
“the trial served as a sort of national group therapy.”)
164 David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable
Shortcomings, 26-FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 14 (2002)
165 Id. at 8, 12.
166
JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 135, at 36-39 (documenting complaints by Bosnian officials that they were treated
with disrespect by ICTY officials and that they did not have open channels of communication with the ICTY)
167 Id. at 8.
162
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enforcement of these important laws in the courts that ultimately matter most, i.e., the
region’s domestic courts.”168
And the ICTR, by trying all high-level officials, but leaving the hundreds of
thousands of “small fish” to Rwandan tribunals, has helped reinforce perceptions of
inadequacy of the Rwandan justice system. Had the ICTR left one or more high-stakes
trials to national courts, it could have helped both reconciliation and the affirmation of the
rule of law in Rwanda. As Jose Alvarez observes, “[a] local trial for Bagasora [a colonel
indicted on genocide charges by the ICTR], even one subject to extensive international
observation or even the possibility of appeal to the ICTR, would have affirmed to the
world, and most importantly to all Rwandans, that Rwanda’s institutions, including its
judiciary, were capable of rendering justice even with respect to formerly exalted public
officials.”169
For all the reasons discussed in this Section—the lack of diversity on the ICC, the
Court’s remoteness from the place where the crime was committed, and its minimal
impact on reconciliation—the real success of international criminal law will come when
domestic legal systems begin enforcing human rights principles more consistently. As
Jonathan Charney has argued, “[t]he test of that success is not a large docket of cases
before the ICC, but persistent and comprehensive domestic criminal proceedings
worldwide, facilitated by progress in a variety of contexts toward discouraging
international crimes and avoiding impunity.”170
III. THE ICC AS AN AID TO LOCAL JUSTICE
If international criminal law is best enforced in a decentralized fashion, what is left
for the ICC to do? Contrary to what many conservatives and political realists might argue,
the ICC need not fold up its operations. As this Part argues, the Court can and should
play an important role in encouraging and assisting national courts in enforcing human
rights and humanitarian law. By collaborating with national courts in war crimes
prosecutions, the Court could have a less dominant, but more enduring effect on the
implementation of international criminal law.

Id.
Alvarez, supra note 5, at 402.
170 Jonathan Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Courts, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 120, 123 (2001)
168
169
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A. The Case for Engaging National Authorities
Even if centralization has many problems, eliminating the ICC altogether is not a
better alternative. Advocates of the International Criminal Court have repeatedly pointed
out the failure of various national governments to fulfill their responsibilities to prosecute
international crimes.171 From the Congo, to Cambodia, to Uruguay, a number of national
authorities have been either unwilling or unable to try alleged war criminals. Victims
have remained without recourse to justice, the rule of law in those countries has suffered,
and international criminal law has remained a dead letter.
The ICC does have the potential to make a difference in the enforcement of
international criminal law in those countries. It can do so not so much by issuing
progressive opinions from the bench in The Hague, but rather by prodding and assisting
national authorities to fulfill their duty to prosecute international crimes. This role for the
ICC may be less visible internationally, and its influence may be felt more slowly. Its
effect on domestic constituencies around the globe, however, will be more enduring.
Evidence from other international courts suggests that this incrementalist
approach of working with national authorities and national elites is indeed effective. Two
of the more successful supranational courts, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), have worked closely with domestic actors—
courts, agencies, organizations, and private citizens—to ground their legal authority.
Observers of the European Court of Justice have emphasized the extent to which the ECJ
has relied on national courts to reinforce and even expand its jurisdiction.172 The court
achieved enforcement of its mandates “by ‘shaming’ and ‘coopting’ domestic law-makers,
judges and citizens, who then pressure[d] governments for compliance.” 173 Because most
cases that came to the ECJ were referred to it by national courts, the European Court

Richard H. Stanley, Establishing an International Criminal Court and the Pursuit of Justice, in REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 207, 208 (Christopher C. Joyner & M.
Cherif Bassiouni eds. 1998); Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1998); Leila
Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J.665, 710 (1996)
172 Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe, 1 EUR. J. INT'L REL.
157, 179-80 (1995) It is worth noting that the ECJ was particularly interested in establishing close relations with national
courts, because it depended on those courts to refer cases to it. Anne-Marie Slaugher & Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Theory
of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 291 (1997)
173 Moravcsik, supra note 172, at 158.
171
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engaged in a conscious effort to win the “cooperation and goodwill of the state courts”;174
in its extensive publicity and education campaigns, the court invited state judges to
seminars, dinners, and regular visits to the ECJ’s chambers in Luxembourg.175
Unlike the ECJ, which depended largely on national courts for its caseload, the
ECHR could receive petitions from individual litigants, and that is where most of its cases
have come from. As a result, the ECHR has had to strike a delicate balance between
appealing directly to individuals and organizations that represent their interests, and, at
the same time, developing strong ties to state authorities, which would ultimately be
responsible for implementing the court’s decisions.176 To address the latter concern, early
in its operation, the ECHR developed the doctrine of margin of appreciation, which gives
states some leeway in interpreting and applying the European Convention on Human
Rights.177 The court recognized that “a government’s discharge of [its] responsibilities is
essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex factors and of balancing conflicting
considerations of the public interest”178 and expressed respect for the space that the
government needs to make these difficult policy determinations. In deciding how wide a
margin to afford to a government, the ECHR has looked to the degree of consensus
among the national laws of signatory states with respect to the challenged policy.179
G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 595, 605 (1989), cited in Slaughter &
Helfer, supra note 111, at 302.
175 HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 247 (1986), cited in Slaughter & Helfer, supra
note 172, at 302.
176 Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 111.
177 Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 408 (1960-1961) In that respect, the ECHR is building on the tradition of the
Catholic Church in medieval Europe, which spread the universal moral and legal principles of the canon law, while at the
same time accommodating differences in local laws and customs. Despite its claims to universality, the Church recognized
the existence and validity of a plurality of legal regimes within Europe and limited its jurisdiction accordingly, to a select
group of persons and subject matters. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 225 (1983) In addition, the canon law substantively accommodated secular law and custom. For example,
canonists relied on “the pious custom” of the land to resolve interpretive ambiguities in some areas of the canon law.
RICHARD H. HELMHOLZ, THE IUS COMMUNE IN ENGLAND 53 (2001) A notable example is the development of the law of
sanctuary, with respect to which the church “did not seek to impose entire uniformity of practice in the law of sanctuary on
local churches” and instead allowed “bishops to accept local customs and limitations.” Id. at 56-57.
178 Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 408.
179 Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 111, at 316-317; X v. United Kingdom, No. 75/1995/581/667, slip op. at 13 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Apr. 22, 1997) (“The Court observes that there is no common European standard with regard to the granting of parental
rights to transsexuals. . . . Since the issues in the case, therefore, touch on areas where there is little common ground
amongst the member States of the Council of Europe and, generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage,
the respondent State must be afforded a wide margin of appreciation.); Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, 295-A Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 19 (1994) (finding that the lack of a uniform European conception of rights to freedom of expression “directed
against religious feelings of others” dictates a wider margin of appreciation) Some commentators have pointed to the
danger that the doctrine might be applied too broadly and obliterate any meaningful supranational judicial review of
suspect national practices. See, e.g., Oren Gross, “Once More Unto the Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying the European
Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 437, 497 (1998) (“The practice of the Court and the
174
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As the examples of the European Courts suggest, enforcing international law
through national institutions is likely to be more lasting. A burgeoning literature on
transgovernmental networks also emphasizes the potential of implementing international
law by forming transnational coalitions to assist local elites and institutions in that task.180
The price for this effectiveness, however, is that it takes a longer time. As Anne-Marie
Slaughter and Laurence Helfer observe, “finding and recruiting domestic institutions as
partners is likely to be a slow and sticky process.”181 Patience may be too much to ask
when violations of fundamental human rights remain unpunished. On the other hand,
rushing the process may only undermine progress toward better human rights
enforcement, as the evidence from the Caribbean states suggests.182 In the end,
international law’s best hope may be a gradual but broad diffusion of its norms through
national governments and elites.183
The ICC will therefore mark its greatest achievement when it captures the minds
of local judges, prosecutors, and investigators who will work on the ground to promote
international human rights and humanitarian law. More recently, the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has itself begun rethinking its isolation from its
national counterparts in Yugoslavia. Last year, its former President Judge Jorda indicated
an interest in referring some cases from the ICTY to local courts, observing that: “It is
essential to work with the existing organs and judicial institutions—if only by assisting
them—since they constitute essential reference points for all citizens . . . justice must be

Commission demonstrates the pernicious use of the doctrine to avoid conducting an independent examination of the
evidence and the tendency to succumb to the position of the relevant national government.”) Despite these dangers of
overbroad application, the doctrine remains valuable as a pragmatic tool for enforcing international law and promoting
dialogue between international tribunals and national communities on sensitive political and legal issues. See, e.g., Paul
Mahoney, Marvelous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1998)
180 Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law,
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (Michael Byers ed.,
2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Governing]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.—Oct. 1997,
at 183 [hereinafter Slaughter, The Real New World Order].
181 Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 111, at 335; see also Moravcsik, supra note, at 159 (“The most effective elements of European
human rights system are thus also the subtlest. This delicate process of legal harmonization proceeds slowly.”)
182 See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
183 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974);
Slaughter, Governing, supra note 180; Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 180.
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brought steadily closer to the people.”184 Judge Jorda is one of the judges appointed to the
ICC—one can hope that he will bring this insight along with him to the new court.
B. Where States Are Willing but Unable To Prosecute: The ICC as a Supporting Institution
for National Courts
How can the ICC engage national authorities in the enforcement of international
criminal law? This Section highlights several possibilities for fruitful interaction between
the ICC and national actors. Under the current admissibility structure, the ICC can take
up a case where it determines that a national judicial system has substantially collapsed.
The question in such instances is purely one of capacity and not of willingness to
prosecute. So, if there are significant benefits to local prosecutions, as Part II has argued,
then the ICC should work to rebuild the capacities of the ailing national judicial system.
In cases where the local government is simply unable to prosecute war crimes by itself,
the ICC should not take cases to The Hague, but instead work with the government to
enforce international criminal law locally.
1. Assisting Local Investigations and Prosecutions
War crimes prosecutions usually take place after an extremely divisive and
disruptive conflict. As a result, many national judicial systems lack the wherewithal to
conduct adequate proceedings. With outside help, however, countries in transition could
regain the capacity to prosecute war crimes fairly and effectively. Practitioners in
countries in transition have suggested that the ICC could help greatly in these situations
by providing logistical support and sharing its expertise.185
At the most basic level, the Court could help by training local judges,
investigators, and prosecutors. It could also offer to share its expertise in matters ranging
from investigation techniques to international law research to victim protection issues.186
It would be well beyond the Court’s mandate to provide basic material resources that
state judiciaries might lack, but the collaboration of ICC officials with local authorities is
184 ICTY Press Release JDH/P.I.S./690-e, Address by His Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the ICTY, to the United
Nations Security Council (July 26, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm; see also Mark A. Drumbl,
Looking Up, Down and Across: The ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order, 37 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 701, 706 (2003)
185 Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Prosecutions, A View From Haiti,
32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201 (2002); Tolbert, supra note 164;
186 Concannon, Jr., supra note 185, at 240-44; Tolbert, supra note 164, at 16.
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likely to raise awareness of these needs among international donors. And by offering its
resources and expertise during joint investigations with local authorities, the ICC could
also relieve financial pressure on domestic judicial and investigative offices.187
With the consent of the national government, the ICC could provide more than
logistical support and training to domestic authorities. Its officers could perform joint
investigations and prosecutions on the ground.
Such a proposal was put forth by Senator Arlen Specter in the early stages of
discussions about a permanent international criminal court. Senator Specter proposed that
the international community create a standing body—an international or regional
tribunal, which would have investigative, prosecutorial and judicial staff, but which
would be used mainly to support domestic authorities in their efforts to prosecute
transnational crimes. Countries would have the option of prosecuting a case on their own,
utilizing the investigative and legal expertise of the standing international court while
retaining control over cases, or fully transferring a case to the international court.188 The
court’s main function would be to promote local prosecutions; it would not serve as “a
substitute for or a distraction from domestic prosecution, but [as] an additional means
and facilitator for either domestic or international prosecution of international crimes.”189
The ICC Statute could accommodate this supporting and collaborative role for its
investigators and prosecutors. Upon the request by a member state, the Court can
cooperate with that state’s authorities in investigating offenses within the jurisdiction of
the Court, or even offenses that constitute “a serious crime under the national law of the
requesting State.”190 Under certain conditions, the Court may also provide assistance to
states that are not parties to the Rome Statute.191 The types of cooperation and assistance
explicitly authorized by the Statute include the transmission of evidence obtained by the
Court and the questioning of persons detained by the order of the Court.192
This cooperation can even occur on the territory of the state where the crime was
committed. The Statute allows the Court to “exercise its functions and powers . . . on the

Concannon, Jr., supra note 185, at 237.
136 Cong. Rec. S8082-83.
189 136 Cong. Rec. S8081-82.
190 ICC Statute art. 93 (10) (a)
191 ICC Statute art. 93 (10) (c)
192 ICC Statute art. 93 (10) (b)
187
188
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territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other
State.”193 Although Article 42 provides that a member of the Office of the Prosecutor “shall
not seek or act on instructions from any external source,”194 a properly drafted
cooperation agreement could ensure that the ICC investigators and prosecutors are acting
upon instructions of their Hague supervisors, even as they collaborate with local officers.
A statutory amendment, explicitly authorizing ICC officials to provide assistance to local
authorities, could also allow the ICC to train local officials in investigative techniques and
victims’ issues.
The ICC should actively promote such cooperation arrangements. Joint
investigations harness the advantages of local prosecutions, even where the local criminal
justice system is not fully capable of conducting such prosecutions by itself. By providing
technical and logistical support to local authorities, this arrangement also increases the
likelihood of effective prosecutions. Effective prosecutions, in turn, increase public respect
for the legal system and thus promote the rule of law over the long run. Finally, the
collaboration between national and international investigators and prosecutors also has
the potential to spur a productive dialogue about the substance and procedure of
prosecutions for international crimes.
2. The ICC as a Circuit Rider
Senator Specter’s proposal did not envision the possibility of joint judicial
proceedings. Under his proposal, national judges would preside over national trials, and
international judges would preside over the trials referred to the ICC by national
authorities. Yet the logic of Specter’s plan applies to judicial, not merely investigative and
prosecutorial, collaboration. During the drafting of the ICC Statute, some delegates put
forth just such a model, under which the ICC would serve as a “traveling court,”195
conducting both investigations and proceedings at the location where crimes were
committed.196 In effect, ICC judges would serve on ad hoc mixed courts, akin to the ones

ICC Statute art. 4 (2)
ICC Statute art. 42.
195 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Financing, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE, supra note, at 315, 321 (citing UN Doc. A/AC.244/L.2
para.248)
196 Id. at 321.
193
194
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currently used in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo. Importantly, this model was
proposed as a cost-saving measure.197
The popularity of mixed courts over the last several years suggests that having
ICC prosecutors and judges conduct trials on the ground, with the cooperation of local
authorities, might be a viable option where domestic authorities are willing but unable to
prosecute war crimes. Countries in transition themselves have favored mixed courts.
When the Rwandan government first contemplated prosecuting war crimes committed on
its territory and asked for international aid, “it hoped that international assistance would
take the form of joint trials and investigations, or at least international proceedings within
Rwanda.”198 The Sierra Leonean government,199 Cambodian government, and East
Timorese lawyers200 also asked the international community to set up mixed courts on
their territory.201 The Bush administration has also favored mixed courts as a superior
alternative to the ICC202 and is considering a similar model for a court to try Iraqi officials
for crimes against humanity.203 Finally, the UN itself has lent its support to hybrid courts:
With the consent and assistance of local authorities, the UN established such courts in
Kosovo,204 East Timor, and Sierra Leone,205 and is negotiating a similar arrangement with
the Cambodian government. Although it is too early to make a comprehensive assessment
of the performance of these mixed courts, given their popularity with both the
international legal community and nation states, it is useful to analyze their potential
strengths and weaknesses.

Id.
Alvarez, supra note 4, at 393.
199 U.N. Doc S/2000/915; Micaela Frulli, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 857 (2000)
200 The East Timor legal community was split on this issue Despite the insistence by some international and East Timorese
NGOs on an international tribunal for East Timor, UNTAET, with the support of other East Timorese lawyers, decided on a
mixed court model largely based on the proposed court for Cambodia.
201 A recent survey of Bosnian judges also shows support for mixed courts that would take place in Bosnia and actively
involve Bosnian legal officials in the process. JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 135, at 36.
202 E.g., Pierre-Richard Prosper, Justice Without Borders: The International Criminal Court, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 85, 89
(2003)
203 Heidi Kingstone, Out of the Killing Fields, JERUSALEM REP., June 30, 2003, at 24; Michelle Mittelstadt, U.S. Has Few Options
Palatable to World for Charging War Criminals, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 18, 2003.
204 The project for a mixed War Crimes Court in Kosovo was never implemented, but pursuant to a regulation of the UN
Mission in Kosovo, an international judge sits alongside local judges in war crimes cases in regular domestic courts.
205 S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000)
197
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a. Structure and Functions of Mixed Courts
Mixed tribunals operate in the country where the atrocities took place, but rely on
the combined expertise of local and international judges, prosecutors, and investigators.
In the Sierra Leonean and East Timorese hybrid courts, two-thirds of the judges are UNappointed, and the remaining third is local or at least appointed by the national
government.206 The Kosovo courts include a majority of local judges sitting together with
judges appointed by the UN.207 After years of difficult negotiations concerning its
composition, the proposed court for Cambodia would include panels with a majority of
Cambodian judges and a prosecutor’s office headed by one Cambodian- and one UNappointed lawyer.208
The international community is heavily involved in both the creation and
financing of mixed tribunals and therefore plays a significant role in devising the legal
standards and procedures used by those tribunals. At the same time, mixed courts are
designed to suit the needs of the host country and to involve the local population in the
proceedings.
One way in which hybrid courts address local needs is that their subject matter
jurisdiction incorporates both domestic and international criminal law.209 The inclusion of
domestic law allows the courts to address crimes that were pervasive during a particular
conflict, but are not necessarily covered by international criminal law. For instance, the
statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone criminalizes abuses of girls under fourteen
and the abduction and forced recruitment of children.210 These provisions reflect the
nature of the atrocities committed in Sierra Leone, where thousands of children were
abducted and forced to fight in the civil war, or became victims of rape and physical
abuse.211 Furthermore, unlike international criminal tribunals, which have personal
jurisdiction only over adults, the Special Court can try individuals who were fifteen or

Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F. 185 (2001)
Id.
208 To avoid the potential deadlock from having co-prosecutors, the statute for the Cambodian mixed court provides that, in
the case of disagreement between the two prosecutors, the prosecution would continue, except that one of the prosecutors
could bring the case for review by the pre-trial Chamber within thirty days. Unless a supermajority of the pre-trial
Chamber (four out of five judges) agrees that no basis for the prosecution exists, the prosecution would continue. Linton,
supra note 206, at 192.
209 E.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 1-5, reprinted in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note, at 605, 606.
210 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 4 (c), 5 (a)
211 Jennifer L. Poole, Post-Conflict Justice in Sierra Leone, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note, at 563, 583.
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older at the time they allegedly committed the crime.212 Although international experts
wanted to limit the jurisdiction of the Special Court to adults, the Sierra Leonean
government maintained that this would hurt the legitimacy of the Court. Sierra Leoneans,
the government argued, demanded that child soldiers, who were among the most brutal
perpetrators of war crimes, be held accountable.213 While the government prevailed on
that point, in deference to international demands, the Statute provides for special
remedies and procedures in trials of juvenile offenders. The Statute also emphasizes the
desirability of rehabilitating and reintegrating juveniles into society.214
Like the Special Court in Sierra Leone, both the Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor
and the proposed Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia have subject-matter jurisdiction
over international as well as domestic crimes. In Cambodia, among the domestic crimes
included are homicide, torture, and religious persecution, for which the statute of
limitations is extended for twenty years.215 The proposed statute also provides for the
prosecution of violations of the Hague Cultural Property Convention, in reflection of the
pervasive attacks on Cambodia’s cultural heritage during the rule of the Khmer Rouge.216
In East Timor, the Serious Crimes Unit can prosecute war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as well as murders, sexual crimes, and arson attacks committed during the
1999 referendum on independence of the island nation.217
In addition to incorporating local laws in their proceedings, mixed courts are also
better able than international tribunals to engage the local population in their
proceedings.218 Thus officials from Sierra Leone’s Special Court have been visiting local
schools and government agencies and have engineered publicity campaigns to educate
local communities about the court’s work.219 They have further raised awareness about the
Court’s work by traveling around the country to collect evidence.220 The media have also

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 7.
Poole, supra note 211, at 583.
214 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 7.
215 Linton, supra note 206, at 193.
216 Id. at 196.
217 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Reg. No. 2000/15 (6 June 2000) §§ 3, 8, 9; Jill Jolliffe, A Year To
Remember, THE AGE (Melbourne), May 20, 2003, A3.
218Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN SCOR, 55th Sess., P7, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/1199 (2000); Tolbert, supra note 164 (citing as one of the deficiencies of the ICTY its inability to educate the public in
the former Yugoslavia about the goals and work of the international tribunal)
219
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE “LEGACY” OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 17 (2003)
220
At http://www.allafrica.com. [AU]
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covered the proceedings of domestically based courts more extensively than those of
international tribunals. More extended coverage raises public awareness of the tribunals
and stimulates a dialogue about the process of reckoning with the past.
Because of their location, mixed courts also manage better to coordinate their
functions with other domestic institutions dealing with human rights abuses, such as the
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions set up in Sierra Leone and East Timor.221 Such
coordination prevents overlap and encourages a more efficient division of institutional
responsibilities for dealing with the past. For example, in East Timor, the Truth
Commission serves reconciliation efforts by holding public hearings to investigate the
truth about the conflict in East Timor and by initiating “community reconciliation
procedures” (“CRP”) at the regional level. At regional CRP hearings, lower-level
criminals (who have committed incidental acts of violence or theft, but not a serious
criminal offence within the jurisdiction of the Serious Crimes Unit) can testify, ask their
victims and the community for forgiveness, and offer to make reparations or perform
community service.222 In return, they are absolved from criminal responsibility for these
crimes and reintegrated into the community. At the same time, the Serious Crimes Unit
serves retribution and deterrence functions by indicting higher-level officials.223 This
division of labor both conserves scarce resources and helps with national reconciliation.
In Sierra Leone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission handles most juvenile
offenders, who were often abducted and forced to perform horrible crimes.224 By contrast,
the Special Court focuses on higher-ups and particularly brutal perpetrators. This
approach encourages not only a fair and proportionate treatment of different offenders,
but also the reintegration of combatants into society, which is essential to rebuilding peace
and stability in the country.225

Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN SCOR, 55th Sess., PP51-53,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/1199 (2000) (describing the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights
Commission, and a “data-gathering” project” to supplement the Special Court); Lisa Clausen, Slow Road to Justice, TIME, Mar
24, 2003, at 48 (describing perceptions of the Truth Commission as the institution dealing with low-level criminals and the
Serious Crimes Unit as the court charged with handling high officials) .
222 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Reg. No. 2001/10 (13 July 2001), On the Establishment of a
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, §§ 27, 32, reprinted in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note,
at 546, 558-59.
223 Clausen, supra note 221.
224 Poole, supra note 211, at 590.
225 See id. at 591.
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Mixed courts have also been generally more effective than international tribunals
in processing cases. In less than three years, even as delays, language problems and
inexperienced lawyers have impeded its work, the Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor has
obtained thirty-two convictions and issued fifty-eight indictments involving 240 people.226
By contrast, in its first eight years, the ICTY had issued nineteen judgments,227 while the
ICTR had issued only eight judgments in six years.228 Especially given the significantly
larger budgets of the international tribunals, these figures underscore the efficiency of
mixed courts.229
b. Overcoming the Challenges of Mixed Courts
Despite their substantial long-term benefits, mixed court projects can be derailed
by practical difficulties in their implementation. For example, differences in legal practices
can cause conflicts among judicial officials and difficulties and delays in the
administration of justice. Although this problem is also present in international tribunals,
it is accentuated in mixed tribunals. First, mixed tribunals operate in a post-conflict
environment, where the basic infrastructure is often in shambles, which exacerbates the
delays in the administration of justice. Second, mixed courts rely more extensively on
local laws and procedures, narrowing the common ground of legal expertise between
national and international judges and thus causing longer deliberations about cases.230
Delays occasioned by a frail infrastructure, however, will always plague
enforcement in countries emerging from a violent conflict, whether they investigate on
their own, in the course of a mixed proceeding, or in response to an ICC request. ICC
investigators who take part in mixed proceedings will at least directly proceed to
gathering evidence, instead of having to go through the notoriously slow “diplomatic
channels” for requesting cooperation.231 By establishing a working relationship on the

Clausen, supra note221.
ICTY, Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm (last visited July 17, 2003)
228 ICTR, ICTR Detainees, at http://www.ictr.org/english/factsheets/detainee.htm (last visited July 17, 2003)
229 While the ICTR’s and ICTY’s budgets have averaged about $75 million per year, the budget of the whole UN mission in
East Timor, of which the funds for the Special Court are but a fraction, comes to $28 million a year. See Elizabeth Neuffer,
Lagging Tribunal Is Called a Threat to a Viable East Timor; Slaughter Suspects Elude UN’s Reach, B. Globe, Sept. 2, 2001, at A6
(citing the budget of the UN mission); Linton, supra note 206, at 205 n.69 (citing the serious lack of resources at the East
Timor mixed courts)
230 Linton, supra note 206, at 200.
231 ICC Statute art. 87 (1)
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ground with local officials, they would also be less likely to encounter the suspicion and
resistance that often greets requests for cooperation from foreign tribunals.
Another challenge of mixed courts is the potential for bias or unfairness. Even
with the presence of international officials on the ground, host governments could
attempt to manipulate the process by putting pressure on local judges and prosecutors.232
This was one of the major concerns of the Group of Experts evaluating the feasibility of
holding domestic trials in Cambodia for the former Khmer Rouge leaders (some of whom
had struck political bargains with the current regime of Hun Sen and were allegedly
promised impunity) The Group concluded that only an ad hoc UN tribunal held outside
of Cambodia would meet international standards of justice.233 Because Cambodian
authorities “still lack[ed] a culture of respect for an impartial criminal justice system,”
neither a domestic nor a mixed tribunal would be effective and free from political
manipulation.234
These concerns have been largely addressed by the voting rules and composition
of mixed courts in Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. In East Timor and Sierra
Leone, two-thirds of the judges are international, so every decision requires the consent of
at least one international judge. This arrangement dramatically reduces the effect of any
political pressure that the local government may put on local judges. In Cambodia, where
the majority of judges are local, a supermajority vote is required for a decision of guilt and
innocence, so that an international judge must always consent to an acquittal or a
conviction. Many important decisions, however, are decided by a majority rule, which has
concerned some commentators.235 To address those concerns, future ICC-sponsored
mixed courts could either opt for a supermajority vote on most major decisions or follow
the Sierra Leonean and East Timorese model and include a majority of international
judges on each panel. Either solution would present a good balance between, on the one

As one commentator on legal reform has observed:
The technical aspect of providing training and materials to judiciaries is straightforward, and it is this idea
that international efforts focus on. More elusive is the task of restoring to the judiciary the two vital traits it
requires to function under the rule of law: independence and impartiality. The greatest obstacle to judicial
reform in many countries is eliminating the influence of the executive branch of government.
RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION 65 (2002)
233 Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 948, 951 (1999)
234 Id.
235 Linton, supra note 206, at 199 (noting with concern that aside from guilt and innocence, all other decisions will be made
on the basis of a majority vote)
232
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hand, concerns for fairness and impartiality and, on the other hand, local participation
and diversity on the bench.236
Designing the structure and voting rules of a mixed tribunal would be difficult,
however, in situations where the tribunal has jurisdiction over crimes arising from a
multi-ethnic or multi-national conflict. Mixed tribunals would have to balance the
authority not only of local and international judges, but also of local judges from different
ethnicities or nationalities. To some extent, this model has already been tried with success
in Kosovo, where both Kosovar Albanian and Kosovar Serb judges have sat on war
crimes trials, alongside their international counterparts. It is also the proposed model for
the court successor to the ICTY. The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia has
proposed that once the ICTY completes its work, a tribunal be set up in Bosnia to try the
remaining cases of war crimes. The tribunal would consist of five judges—one Bosnian
Muslim, one Bosnian Serb, one Bosnian Croat, and two international judges.237 [to be
cont.]
…Because of their different composition and voting structures and their sensitivity
to the local context, mixed courts may also produce inconsistency in the way they
interpret international law. The Appeals Chamber of the ICC (the composition of which
would not vary much from case to case) would be in a good position to resolve these
inconsistencies. It will be very important, albeit difficult, for the Appeals Chamber to
demarcate the boundaries between fundamental international law questions, on which
inconsistency is unacceptable, as opposed to questions on which deliberation and
diversity among the hybrid courts is welcome (for example, interpretations of
international law sensitive to local context or questions of procedure and punishment on
which no strong international consensus exists) In deciding how to balance the values of
diversity and sovereignty with the values of coherence of consistency, the Appeals
Chamber may be guided by the existing doctrines of “subsidiarity” and “margin of
appreciation.” [to be cont.]

236 The voting rule could vary according to the political context within which mixed courts are established. Where
international assistance is needed mainly to enhance local material resources, a majority of local judges and a mere majority
voting rule would suffice. Where the international community has serious concerns about fairness and bias, the mixed
courts could operate either under a supermajority voting rule (which brings with it the costs of deadlock and delay) or a
majority international judges (which carries fewer of the benefits of local participation)

237
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c. Statutory Basis for ICC Participation in Mixed Courts
The ICC was not intended to serve as a mixed court, and for it to perform that
function fully and effectively, some amendments to the Statute might be necessary. Some
legal basis for the ICC to serve as a roving mixed court in different countries does exist,
however. As the previous Section discussed, investigators and prosecutors are authorized
to cooperate with local authorities on the ground. The Statute also provides that, although
the seat of the Court will generally be in The Hague, the “Court may sit elsewhere,
whenever it considers it desirable . . . .”238 There are no provisions for including local
judges in the Court’s deliberations, but the Presidency of the Court can propose an
increase in the number of judges, including judges who do not serve on a full-time
basis.239 Article 21 of the Statute, governing applicable law, also provides that the Court
may rely in its decisions “on the national law of States that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crime.”240 National law comes last in the hierarchy of legal sources,
however, and is to be considered only when other sources have proven ambiguous or
useless. Therefore, some amendments to the ICC Statute would be necessary to ensure
that national laws may be used alongside international laws when the ICC serves as a
mixed court.241 Finally, a general provision on the trigger of mixed-court jurisdiction
would be necessary. It would allow the formation of joint investigations or mixed
proceedings, with state consent, where states are unable, but willing to prosecute.242

ICC Statute art. 4 (2)
ICC Statute arts. 36 (2) & 35 (3) The Assembly of States Parties would have to vote on the proposal, and two-thirds are
necessary to approve it. Id. art. 36 (2)
240 ICC Statute art. 21 (1) (c)
241 The Statute may also need to provide interpretive guidelines or rules on resolving potential conflicts between national
and international laws. Where international law concerns fundamental, or peremptory norms, it will automatically trump
national laws (the core prohibitions on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and fundamental principles of
due process embody such peremptory norms) But where there are gaps or ambiguities in international law (for example,
with respect to appropriate punishments and certain aspects of mens rea) or where international law imposes standards,
but not rules (for example, with respect to certain procedural protections), mixed courts should give some deference to
national laws and practices. One model for balancing international norms with deference to national practices is the
doctrine of “margin of appreciation” developed by the European Court of Human Rights. See supra notes 177-179 and
accompanying text.
242
The ICC Statute prohibits amendments in the first seven years of the Statute’s entry into force, however. In the absence
of a clear statutory provision for mixed courts, such courts can be created by treaty between the ICC and national
authorities and treated by the ICC as “local courts” that would be granted deference under complementarity.
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C. Where States Are Unwilling To Prosecute Their Nationals: A Mixed Court in The Hague
In many cases of post-conflict justice, national governments might be unwilling to
prosecute international crimes themselves and also refuse to allow the ICC to join in on
prosecutions and trials. Even in the face of such reluctance, the Court might be able to
obtain custody of suspects with the help of third states or of international peacekeeping
forces. In those instances, the Court could take up cases in The Hague, as the current
admissibility provisions state.
Although ensuring that the prosecutions will take place is a good first step, it is
not enough. To obtain the advantages of a cross-cultural deliberation, the ICC must go
further. It should include in its ranks and its deliberations lawyers, investigators, and
judges from the affected area and incorporate relevant national law into its decisions. In
effect, the ICC would again form part of a hybrid tribunal, but due to the reluctance of the
national government to cooperate, that tribunal would be deliberating in The Hague
rather than in the country of original jurisdiction.
Under what conditions could such a scenario develop? To begin with, the noncooperating government need not be a rogue regime. There are various reasons why a
government that is not associated with the suspects targeted by the ICC might refuse to
go along with all of the Court’s requests. It might be reluctant to prosecute out of concern
for the stability of the country, or it might worry about its own stability. Accordingly, the
government may give the international tribunal access to some evidence so as not to
alienate the international community, but at the same time refuse to collaborate openly
with the ICC lest it alienate forces on the ground. As mentioned earlier, the only way that
the ICC can apprehend suspects in this case would be with the assistance of third states or
of an international peacekeeping force stationed on the territory of the reluctant state. The
former Yugoslavia after the fall of Milosevic is an apt example. The newly elect President
Kostunica cooperated only minimally with the ICTY and for a long time refused to
prosecute or surrender Slobodan Milosevic and other high-level suspects to the tribunal.
The tribunal therefore had to rely largely on international peacekeeping forces stationed
in the former Yugoslavia to capture suspects for its trials.
When one of the above scenarios transpires, the Court would be justified in taking
up the case itself in The Hague. Indeed, that is what the Rome Statute provides. But as
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Part II discussed, ICC prosecutions in The Hague do not reap the benefits of decentralized
enforcement of international criminal law. To gain those benefits, the Court ought to
incorporate into its proceedings judicial officials and laws and procedures from the
country of original jurisdiction. Similar arrangements for including judges of each party’s
nationality are common in international arbitration and in the International Court of
Justice.243 In common law states, the ancient institution of juries de medietate linguae also
provided foreign defendants convicted of international crimes with a jury partly
composed of jurors of the defendant’s nationality.244
As Jose Alvarez writes, incorporating judges from the affected area would have a
salutary effect on the proceedings:
The presence of such judges in the courtroom as well as during deliberations could
encourage a more thorough venting of difficult issues such as those surrounding
the credibility of witnesses (and the role of ethnicity in these determinations),
including through dissenting or separate concurring opinions. Their presence and
views could also generate more nuanced accounts of what it means to be targeted
for violence on the basis of ethnicity. Such judges would also provide the tribunal
with valuable insight as to [domestic] law.245
Having national judges from the affected area would increase the viewpoints expressed
on the Court and would contribute relevant knowledge about the circumstances of the
conflict.
The Court could also incorporate the relevant domestic law in its decisions.
Relying on national law to fill in gaps in international criminal law would add valuable
content to the deliberations of the tribunal. It has the potential to increase the diversity of
points considered in a decision. It is also more likely to be palatable to the relevant
domestic constituency and therefore to reduce the hostility of the national government
toward the Court. For those reasons, as well as for reasons of fair notice to the defendant,

243 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 31; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 37.
244 Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal
for Change, 74 B.U.L. REV. 777 (1994)
245 Alvarez, supra note 4, at 451.
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national law offers a more legitimate interpretive tool than the ICC judges’ own moral
and policy considerations.246
The statutory basis for this model would be similar to the one for mixed courts on
the territory of a state of original jurisdiction.247 Hague-based mixed courts would not
require the explicit consent of the affected state. Whenever possible, however, the Court
should sign agreements with the state of original jurisdiction concerning the status and
functions of the local judges and prosecutors who would serve in The Hague proceedings.
D. Where States Are Unwilling To Prosecute or Surrender Their Nationals: Public Hearings
in The Hague
When the ICC takes up a case in The Hague, it still depends on nation states and
on the international community to enforce its orders. In certain instances, the Court will
be unable either to gather evidence or to obtain the custody of suspects, and if it opens up
investigations, its orders will be publicly flouted by a rogue regime. Without the presence
on the ground of a peacekeeping force sympathetic to it, the ICC could not do its work.
Consider the case of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Even if the ICC had already existed and
had jurisdiction over war crimes committed in Iraq, it could not have prosecuted Hussein
and his cronies while they were still in power. It would not have been able to apprehend
key suspects, even if it had managed to gather important documentary evidence of
human rights abuses from Kurd-controlled territory.
The same problem arises when national authorities declare themselves willing to
prosecute, but then carry out sham investigations and proceedings. Where the ICC
determines that national proceedings were done in bad faith and were inconsistent with a
genuine intent to prosecute, it can itself conduct another round of investigations and
prosecutions, without infringing the rule against double jeopardy inscribed in the ICC
Statute.248 The impugned national governments, however, are not likely to be receptive to

246 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22-A, para. 49 (ICTY Oct. 7, 1997) (judgment) (Cassese, J. dissenting), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/sopinion- e/71007jt3.htm (arguing that, for reasons of fair notice, filling gaps in
international criminal law should be done by reference “to the national jurisdiction of the accused, rather than to moral
considerations or policy-oriented principles,”); see also Kupreskic IT-95-16-T, pp 539-41 [AUT]; S 8083 (noting that “…the
Tribunal will use the substantive law of the transferring state”)
247 See supra Section II.B.1 (c)
248 Article 20 of the Rome Statute delineates the balance between the prohibition on double jeopardy and the principle of
complementarity:
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ICC requests for cooperation or joint investigations. So in these cases, too, the ICC will
have great difficulty gathering evidence and arresting suspects.
Instead of engaging in “judicial romanticism” and taking up cases it cannot
complete, the ICC needs to recreate its mandate in such situations. Where the ICC cannot
obtain key evidence or key suspects, the Court should refrain from commencing a
prosecution and instead hold quasi-judicial public hearings on the human rights abuses
committed by the uncooperative regime. Such hearings would provide an open forum for
the discussion of serious abuses and would gather and preserve evidence for future
prosecutions.
In the United States, the Supreme Court has long recognized that its legitimacy is
badly damaged when the executive refuses to enforce its orders.249 As a result, the Court
has crafted techniques through which it can abstain from deciding a case when its
decision is not likely to be enforced. Indeed, some scholars, notably Alexander Bickel,
have urged courts to use these abstention techniques more often.250 In international law,
too, the International Court of Justice has used admissibility determinations to dispose of
cases where it knows its mandates would be ignored.251 A notable technique is the nonliquet doctrine, which allows the ICJ to abstain where the law is still unsettled.252
Although some might be disturbed by the instrumental nature of these decisions,
they are important not only for the immediate self-preservation of the court that issues
them, but for the long-term legitimacy of the institution and thus for the continued
enforcement of the law it interprets. As Steven Ratner observes in the context of
international criminal law, “[a]ttempts to create criminal law and mechanisms that will be
ignored result only in pretended law, not an improvement in human rights enforcement.
No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court
with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized
by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring
the person concerned to justice.
ICC Statute art. 20.
249 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
250 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 69-70 (1962)
251 Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the International Court of Justice, 18
MICH. J. INT’L L. 399 (1997)
252 W. Michael Reisman, International Non-Liquet: Recrudescence and Transformation, 3 INT’L LAW. 770, 773 (1969) ((arguing
that, not theoretical gaps in the law, but institutional and pragmatic considerations explain and justify the decisions that in
effect are non-liquets even if the Court does not describe them as such))
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Judicial romanticism has serious systemic costs in a global community with sharply
differing notions about the best way to mete out justice to individuals.”253
To avoid falling into the trap of judicial romanticism, the ICC and its Assembly of
States Parties need to reconsider the Court’s mandate in cases where a state is unwilling
to cooperate with the court and refuses to turn over evidence and suspects. The Court
need not give up completely on serving human rights in such situations. It could simply
reform its role to hold public hearings, collecting and preserving evidence that may in the
future be used in criminal proceedings. The Court would not have any direct way to
compel states or individuals to appear before it, and the only direct consequence of its
hearings would be to publicize the evidence collected from voluntary witnesses.
In some ways, the ICC would be performing a function similar to that of the UN
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), although the latter does not hold public hearings
with live testimony.254 Under the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, UNHRC can receive written communications from individuals
who seek relief for human rights violations where domestic remedies are unavailable.
Only citizens of states that have ratified the Optional Protocol can submit complaints to
the Committee.255 Once the Committee finds a complaint admissible, it asks for written
submissions by both the aggrieved individual and the state party. It does not take
testimony or hear oral arguments. The Committee deliberates in private about whether
the submissions indicate a violation of the Covenant and then issues a written decision
(“the views of the Committee”) which contains a statement of the views of the Committee
on the obligation of the State party.256 The views are then forwarded to the parties and
published in the Committee’s annual report to the General Assembly.257
The lack of oral testimony and hearings in the UNHCR has diminished the
Committee’s shaming effect on delinquent states. One observer identifies “the absence of
direct and effective fact-finding” as a “basic weakness in the system” and blames the

Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 237, 256 (1998)
The fact-finding Commission provided for in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention performs similar functions.
255 [AUT: update #] United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Human Rights Committee, Press Release: Human Rights
Committee Concludes Three-Week Headquarters Session, U.N. Doc. HR/CT/494 (1997)
256 DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 125 (1991)
257 Optional Protocol, art. 15 (4), 999 U.N.T.S. 303.
253
254
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ineffectiveness of the Committee on it.258 Therefore, when the ICC holds its hearings, it
should not simply receive written submissions, but invite witnesses to testify publicly
(and offer them protection, where feasible) about suspected war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. The Court should make findings of facts and open wide its
doors to media from around the world, and especially from the affected country, to cover
the proceedings. The coverage could have a strong shaming effect on the states publicly
identified as uncooperative and unwilling to prosecute, and individuals as suspects.259
The findings of the Court would not provide a direct remedy to the victims.
Instead, the hearings’ contribution would consist in preserving evidence for future
prosecutions and providing a forum for the victims to air their grievances. By shaming the
uncooperative governments, the proceedings could also strengthen the hand of
opposition forces in the affected countries. However minimal their direct effect, the
hearings would contribute more to the enforcement of international criminal law than
would an empty judicial order flouted by a rogue regime or inaction by both the ICC and
national authorities.
E. Encouraging Statutory Development
By its very existence, the Court is bound to have a subtle influence on the
enforcement of international criminal law, promoting statutory development in countries
around the world. Two main factors account for this influence. First, the ICC Treaty was
produced as a result of long negotiations among delegates from 150 states. Despite the
numerous disagreements among them, 120 states signed on to the final product,
indicating at least minimal consensus on the statutory framework of the ICC. Second and
more important, states that have signed and ratified the ICC Treaty have a strong
258 Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 369, 437 (Philip Alston ed.,
1992)
259 Such strategies have worked in the International Labor Organization, where the International Labor Conference's
Committee on the Application of Standards has achieved better compliance with labor rights by singling out a few violators
of in its annual report to the full conference and thus mobilizing international public opinion against those violators.
Richard B. Bilder & Frederic L. Kirgis , 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 741, 743 (2002) (reviewing PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN,
BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2001)); see also Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions:
Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 160, 17677 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) (“Policy-makers, like private individuals, are sensitive to the social
opprobrium that accompanies violations of widely accepted behavioral prescriptions. They are, in short, motivated by a
desire to avoid the sense of shame or social disgrace that commonly befalls those who break widely accepted rules.”);
Phillip R. Trimble, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 46 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 465, 466 (2002) (noting that shaming abusive
governments has been one of the most verifiable achievements of the human rights movement)
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incentive to pass legislation that criminalizes the core offenses listed in the Statute. Both
under the current ICC Statute and under the proposal articulated in this Article, the ICC
could take away cases from countries that do not have adequate legislation to prosecute
international crimes. As one commentator has observed, states will be more likely to
“pursue domestic prosecutions of international crimes so as not to trigger the jurisdiction
of the ICC over the case and invite the glare of the eyes of the international community. . .
.”260
Implementing legislation is likely to bring both substantive and procedural
changes in domestic law. Many countries will need to incorporate into their domestic law
prohibitions on crimes against humanity and breaches of the Geneva Conventions. To
avoid a finding of “inability to prosecute,” some states might also need to amend their
criminal procedure laws to meet minimum fair trial standards under international law.
Although some commentators have suggested that complementarity would require
signatory states “to enact further rights for the accused,”261 in fact, only rudimentary fair
trial guarantees are needed to retain national control over war crimes prosecutions
(proceedings must be conducted “independently or impartially in accordance with the
norms of due process recognized by international law”262)
As Section II.B discussed, the definitions of crimes in the Rome Statute are still
incomplete, but legislatures could use those statutory definitions as a starting point and
build on them in accordance with national preferences. It is precisely such legislative
experimentation that would provide the basis for the cross-national deliberation and
improvement of international criminal law and procedure.
Whereas the ICC Statute does not require states to pass implementing legislation
on criminalizing offenses listed in the Statute, it does enjoin states parties to pass laws on
the cooperation of national authorities with the ICC. Countries have to “ensure that there
are procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation,”263
including provisions on witness protection, financial assistance to the ICC, extradition of
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nationals, and recognition of the privileges and immunities of ICC staff.264 As a result, one
can expect states to pass legislation to fulfill their duties—at least on paper—under the
Rome treaty. There is mounting evidence that states have begun to do so.
One of the main contributions of the ICC, therefore, will be in providing, through
its statute and rules, a legal framework and language that national governments can
utilize as a template for their own war crimes statutes. Once states pass implementing
legislation, they will be more likely to use it by bringing war crimes prosecutions. The
mere creation of the ICC as a complementary institution to domestic tribunal thus
“dramatically increases the role of national courts in undertaking trials involving
international crime.”265 Indirectly, but effectively, it encourages broader enforcement of
human rights and humanitarian law.
CONCLUSION
International law scholars often assume that the best way to enforce human rights
is by establishing strong international institutions that develop the law progressively and
enforce it independently. Political realists counter that such institutions are only as useful
as powerful states permit them to be, and discourage expansive visions of their mandate.
Partisans of the ICC must come to terms with the realist challenge. They must work to
adapt the institution accordingly, without abandoning hope for the project altogether.
The ICC will undoubtedly be constrained by the state support it commands, but it can
make a difference in the enforcement of human rights law by encouraging and assisting
national authorities in upholding and enforcing international law.
The ICC and its supporters must decide how the institution will use the powers it
has. If it pursues a path of centralization and insularity, it will encounter resistance from
member states and from the United States and bring about few of the benefits of
reconciliation and institution-building that its founders envisioned. If the Court engages
in joint investigations and trials with national authorities, along the lines set forth in this
Article, enforcement of international criminal law will become more agreeable to the
participating states, who will feel a sense of ownership and control over the process. In
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this new, less dominant role, the Court might even become acceptable to the United States
whose support is critical for the Court’s effectiveness.
The mixed-court model for the ICC holds out the promise of strengthening local
capacities and contributes to the rebuilding of the rule of law in nations around the globe.
It would move international human rights law in directions that its true friends must
admit are ultimately wise and necessary—toward a system of law that is better informed,
more widely accepted, and better enforced.
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University of Chicago Law School
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